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ABSTRACT
Modeling competition in natural gas markets
by
Burcu Ciğerli
This dissertation consists of three chapters; each models competition in natural gas
markets. These models provide insight into interactions between changes in market
conditions/policies and market players’ strategic behavior. In all three chapters, we
apply our models to a natural gas trade network formed by using BP’s Statistical
Review of World Energy 2010 major trade flows.
In the first chapter, we develop a model for the world natural gas market where
buyers and sellers are connected by a trading network. Each natural gas producer
is a Cournot player with a fixed supply capacity. Each of them is also connected to
a unique set of importing markets. We show that this constrained noncooperative
Cournot game is a potential game and its potential function has a unique maximizer.
In the scenario analysis, we find that any exogenous change aﬀecting Europe also
has an eﬀect in the Asia Pacific. The reason is that two big producers, Russia and the
Middle East, are connected to both markets. We also find that a collusive agreement
between Russia and the Middle East leads them to specialize in supply to markets
based on their marginal costs of exporting natural gas.
The second chapter is devoted to analyzing the impacts of North American shale
gas on the world natural gas market. To better represent the North American natural
gas market, this chapter also allows for perfect competition in that market. We find
that North America exports natural gas when its supply curve is highly elastic and
hence the domestic price impact of its exports is very small. Even so, the price impacts
on the importing markets are substantial. We also find that shale gas development in
North America decreases dominant producers’ market power elsewhere in the world
and hence decreases the incentive of any parties to form a natural gas cartel.
In the third chapter, we relax the assumption of fixed supply capacities and allow
for natural gas producers to invest in their supply capacities. We assume a two
period model with no uncertainty and show that there is a unique Cournot-Nash
equilibrium and the open-loop Cournot-Nash equilibrium and closed-loop Cournot-
Nash equilibrium investments coincide.
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1Chapter 1
An imperfectly competitive model of the world
natural gas market
1.1 Introduction
World natural gas production is concentrated in a small number of producers, the ma-
jority of which are state-owned companies. For instance, Russia’s biggest natural gas
producer, Gazprom, controls 70 percent of Russian natural gas reserves and produces
78 percent of all Russian natural gas.1 Similarly, state-owned Sonatrach2 dominates
natural gas production and wholesale distribution in Algeria, while state-owned Sonel-
gaz controls retail distribution.3 These state-owned companies have monopoly power
in their domestic markets, but their ability to exploit it is limited since their actions
are highly regulated by their governments.4 Once they export natural gas via long
distance pipeline or liquefied natural gas (LNG), they must compete with each other
and sometimes with domestic suppliers in the European, Asian or North American
markets. In contrast to supply, the demand for natural gas in these foreign markets
is not as concentrated. In this chapter, we assume that natural gas consumers (e.g.,
utility service providers) do not have any bargaining power and are passive agents.
We then analyze the strategic behavior of world natural gas producers5 and examine
1See http://www.nord-stream.com/about-us/our-shareholders/
2See Oil and Gas Directory Middle East, 2011.
3Other examples include Qatar Petroleum in Qatar, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
in Nigeria, National Gas Company of Trinidad and Tobago in Trinidad and Tobago, Pertamina in
Indonesia and Petronas in Malaysia.
4For instance, natural gas prices in Russia are regulated by the Federal Tariﬀ Service of the
Russian Federation.
5To make the model tractable, we need to have small number of players. For that reason, we
aggregate producers and consumers based on their geographic locations as well as their role in global
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the impacts of exogenous changes on their behavior.
Long distance, and especially international, natural gas transportation infrastruc-
ture is expensive to construct and generally changes slowly. The high costs of de-
veloping large natural gas projects have also led to long-term contracts tying buyers
to particular sellers. As a simplifying assumption, we consider a network structure
where connections between buyers and sellers are fixed. In our model, a buyer and a
seller must have a relationship, or “link” to trade. For instance, the Yamal pipeline
from Russia to Europe is a link. The cost of building pipelines over long distances
and the high cost of LNG shipment lead to diﬀerences in natural gas prices between
regions. In our model, however, price discrimination by producers also contributes to
price diﬀerentials between markets.
We modify Ilkilic (2010), who develops a bipartite network model for m markets
and n firms in Cournot competition and analyzes how the structure of the network
that connects suppliers with consumers aﬀects the market outcome. Unlike Ilkilic
(2010), we assume that each producer has a supply capacity constraint and solve for
the equilibrium under this constraint. We show that our game can be represented as
a potential game and solve for its equilibrium. We then consider various changes to
the basic model in a number of scenarios.
As a consequence of imperfect competition within this given network structure,
we find that any exogenous change aﬀecting Europe has an oﬀsetting eﬀect in the
Asia Pacific, as two big producers, Russia and the Middle East, are connected to
both markets. We find that if Russia and the Middle East collude, Russia supplies
Europe only whereas the Middle East supplies the Asia Pacific only. We also find
that shale gas development in North America reduces natural gas producers’ market
power around the world.
Section 1.2 reviews the literature on strategic interactions among natural gas
market players. In Section 1.3, we present an overview of the world natural gas
natural gas trade. For instance, we assume that Russia includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Russia.
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market in 2009. In Section 1.4, we define our Cournot game model and solve for
its unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In Section 1.5, we calibrate the Cournot game
parameters based on trade volumes from the 2009 world natural gas network in BP’s
Statistical Review of World Energy 2010 and natural gas prices in 2009. Section 1.6
is devoted to analyzing diﬀerent policy scenarios. The chapter concludes in Section
1.7.
1.2 Related literature
Strategic interactions among natural gas market players have been widely studied.
Mathiesen et al. (1987) were the first to claim that the natural gas market is best
described by a Cournot game, as the majority of natural gas trade is based on long-
term, take-or-pay contracts. Later, Golombek et al. (1995 and 1998) studied the
European natural gas market as a Cournot game. They analyzed the eﬀects of liber-
alization in Europe by distinguishing between upstream and downstream agents and
arguing that deregulation increased upstream competition while leaving downstream
markets regulated. The cost parameters and elasticity parameters of Golombek et
al. (1995) were disaggregated by country6 and hence have been widely used. For
instance, the GASTALE model by Boots et al. (2004) used the marginal cost param-
eters in Golombek et al. (1995), which was the first paper to apply the successive
oligopoly model7 in natural gas production and trading in a large-scale simulation.
However, Golombek et al. (1995) make simplifying assumptions, such as requiring
symmetry among traders and taking domestic supply to be exogenous.
Holz et al. (2006) developed a strategic model of European gas supply, GASMOD,
as a two-stage game. In the first stage, upstream exporters are Stackelberg leaders
6They provide the price elasticities for Belgium, France, Netherlands, Italy, United Kingdom
and West Germany and the cost parameters for Algeria, Commonwealth of Independent States,
Netherlands, Norway and United Kingdom.
7This is a model in which the upstream natural gas producers supply to the downstream traders
to serve consumers located in the foreign country.
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over downstream domestic wholesale traders. In the second stage, downstream traders
take the prices determined by the upstream exporters as given and compete with
each other to supply domestic markets. In particular, unlike GASTALE, GASMOD
assumes that domestic production is endogenous. However, neither GASTALE nor
GASMOD considers the European natural gas market as a network.
Gabriel et al. (2005) using a mixed complementarity8 approach developed an
equilibrium model of natural gas markets. Their model not only covers multiple sea-
sons and years; it also allows for many diﬀerent sectors or agents: producers, storage
operators, peak gas operators, pipeline operators, marketers, and consumers. Mar-
keters and consumers interact strategically, while other trades are competitive. Mar-
keters are price takers when purchasing natural gas from storage operators, pipeline
operators, and peak gas operators but behave strategically when selling to end-use
consumers. At any consumption node, there are several marketers who are connected
to all four sectors; these sectors are residential, commercial, industrial and power.
Their network graph is complete9 and each marketer is only at one consumption
node. Gabriel et al.’s (2005) model has been applied to North American, European
and world natural gas markets.10 In Gabriel et al.’s (2005) model the structure of the
network is not the main consideration. In their model, the “network” has a special
feature: a strategic player at any consumption node is connected to all markets at
that node. Furthermore, each strategic player is connected to only one consumption
node, and all players at a given node have the same objective function.11 This sim-
plifies the problem because there will be a representative strategic player on each
8A mixed complementarity model consists of set of simultaneous (linear or nonlinear) equations
that are mix of strict equalities and inequalities, with each inequality linked to a bounded variable
in a complementarity slackness condition (Rutherford 1995).
9Formally, their graph is a complete bipartite graph meaning that every node of the first set
(marketers) is connected to every node of the second set (end use consumers).
10For its application to the North American natural gas market, see Gabriel et al. (2005), to the
European natural gas market see Egging and Gabriel (2006), Egging et al. (2008) and Holz (2009)
and to the world natural gas market see Egging et al. (2010).
11Each marketer is connected to same sources, pipeline operators, storage operators and peak gas
operators and purchases the natural gas at the same price.
5
consumption node, and the Cournot equilibrium is symmetric.12 By contrast, both in
reality and also in our model, the market power of each natural gas producer depends
on its ability to access markets, and diﬀerent producers will supply a diﬀerent set of
several markets.
The application of oligopolistic market models by Gabriel et al. (2005) to study
natural gas markets diﬀers from ours in two more ways. Their method depends
on the existence of a solution to a system of equations and inequalities that result
from mixed complementarity (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions, whereas ours relies on a con-
strained function minimization procedure. We explicitly use the literature on network
resource allocation problems with coupled constraints to show how one can derive a
minimization procedure that is equivalent to the constrained noncooperative game.
The solution approach that we use, which was introduced by Monderer and Shap-
ley (1997), is called potential games. It has been applied in the electrical engineering
literature on wireless networks and communication network problems.13 A final dif-
ference between our model and Gabriel et al. (2005) is the kind of equilibrium that
they try to establish. They compute a Cournot-Nash equilibrium that would also
satisfy a market clearing condition. We look for a coupled constraint14 Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, which is a more appropriate solution concept for the natural gas net-
work problem. This is because each producer’s value from supplying a given market
depends on its own actions and on the actions of competitors who are connected to
the same market. In addition, a firm’s actions in one market depend on its actions in
other markets to which it is connected.
In summary, our model captures the strategic interactions among the small num-
ber of natural gas producers in the world natural gas network.15 Contrary to previous
12The best response function of a player will be the same as his competitors’ best response
functions due to the symmetry of the Cournot game.
13See Zhu (2008).
14A producer’s supply to a market is constrained by its supply to several other markets.
15The world natural gas network is based on the BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy 2010’s
major trade flows and is not a complete graph. This means that not every producer is connected to
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authors, we assume that the strategic players are heterogeneous in terms of their ac-
cess to markets, their costs of exporting natural gas, and their supply capacities.
1.3 World natural gas market
Taking account of the strategic interaction between suppliers adds to the complexity
of our model. To simplify, we therefore aggregate producers and consumers into a
small number of regions and equilibrium trade flows as shown in the world map in
Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1 : Aggregated representation of producers and consumers and natural gas
trade movements in 2009 (in Bcm)
Since each producer is connected to its domestic market, the number of producers
and consumers is identical and in our case equals nine. In addition, six of the nine
every market.
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producers are exporters, and three of the nine consumers are importers. Producers
and consumers are ordered16 as Europe,17 North America,18 Asia Pacific,19 South
America,20 West Africa,21 North Africa,22 Russia,23 Middle East24 and Australasia.25
According to the BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy 2010, in 2009, North
America’s total natural gas consumption was 828 billion cubic meters (Bcm) and
total production was 812.95 Bcm. In 2009, North America imported 42 percent of its
natural gas from Trinidad and Tobago and 29 percent from Egypt.
In 2009, Europe’s total natural gas consumption was 580.3 Bcm and total produc-
tion was 288.1 Bcm. The production-to-consumption ratio for Europe was 0.49; thus,
more than 50 percent of the natural gas consumed in Europe in 2009 was imported.
Russia was the largest supplier of natural gas to Europe, with a 62 percent share of
imports. The Middle East’s share in European natural gas imports was 8.8 percent
and North Africa’s share was 23.3 percent.
In 2009, Asia Pacific’s total natural gas consumption was 394.4 Bcm and its total
production was 246.1 Bcm. The production-to-consumption ratio for the Asia Pacific
16They are labeled according this order. Producers: Europe labeled as 1, North America labeled
as 2, Asia Pacific labeled as 3, South America labeled as 4, West Africa labeled as 5, North Africa
labeled as 6, Russia labeled as 7, Middle East labeled as 8, Australasia labeled as 9. Consumers are
in the same order as producers and labeled the same.
17Europe includes Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedo-
nia, Moldova, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and Ukraine.
18North America includes Mexico, U.S. and Canada.
19Asia Pacific includes Bangladesh, China, india, Japan, Myanmar, Pakistan, South Korea, Tai-
wan, Thailand and Vietnam.
20South America includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago,
Venezuela.
21West Africa includes Angola, Equatorial Guniea, Mozambique and Nigeria.
22North Africa includes Algeria, Egypt and Libya.
23Russia includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan and Russia.
24Middle East includes Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Qatar, U.A.E.,
Yemen.
25Australasia includes Australia, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines and
Singapore.
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was 0.62. Australasia supplied 59.5 percent of Asia Pacific’s natural gas imports,
making it Asia Pacific’s largest supplier. The Middle East accounted for 31.8 percent
of Asia Pacific’s natural gas imports. Russia exported 6.2 Bcm of natural gas to the
Asia Pacific in 2009, which was 3.7 percent of total imports. Before 2009, Russia had
no natural gas exports to the Asia Pacific.
According to the BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy in 2010, the U.S. Henry
Hub natural gas price was 3.89 USD per million British thermal units (MMBtu).
However, according to the OECD data on natural gas import costs, the U.S. LNG
import cost was 4.52 USD per MMBtu. Due to our single price assumption for each
region, the North American price in this model is 150 million USD per Bcm, which
is approximately 4.18 USD per MMbtu.26
For the natural gas price in the Asia Pacific, we use LNG Japan price data re-
ported by the BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy in 2010, which is 9.06 USD per
MMBtu. For natural gas price in the European market, we use the average of Ger-
man import price, LNG and pipeline import prices for the European Union members
provided by the OECD, which is 8.4 USD per MMbtu.
In our model, natural gas prices in the European and the Asia Pacific markets are
close to each other and higher than the North American price. However, according
to Figure 5 in Medlock (2012) the prices of natural gas at the U.S. Henry Hub,
the UK National Balancing Point, the Platts Japan/Korea Marker were close before
the Fukushima incident. We need to consider the historical natural gas price trends
among these markets in our future research.
1.3.1 Schematic representation of the world natural gas trade
The world natural gas network formed using these statistics27 is shown below.
26This price reflects the natural gas price in Canada, U.S. and Mexico.
27The blue lines indicate that the natural gas is transported via LNG and the black lines indicate
that the natural gas is transported via pipeline. Half of the natural gas exports from North Africa
to Europe are carried via LNG and half of them are carried via pipeline. Each producer is connected
9
Figure 1.2 : Schematic representation
1.4 Model
1.4.1 Notation
There28 are m markets29 d1, ..., dm and n firms30 f1, ..., fn. They are embedded in a
network that links markets with firms, and firms can supply only to the markets to
which they are connected. This network will be represented as a set, g = hD [ F, Li,
of nodes formed by markets D = d1, ..., dm, and firms F = f1, ..., fn and a set of links
L, each link joining a market with a firm. A link from di to fj will be denoted as
(i, j). We say that a market di is linked to a firm fj if fj supplies natural gas to
market di, using the link joining the two. We will use (i, j) 2 g meaning that di and
fj are connected in g.
A graph is connected if there exists a path connecting any two nodes of the graph
while ignoring direction of physical flows. This concept is important because in a
connected graph any change aﬀecting one node will impact all other nodes.
Ng(di) will denote the set of firms linked with di in g = hD[F, Li. More formally:
Ng(di) = {fj 2 F such that (i, j) 2 g} (1.1)
28We use the conventions set forth in Ilkilic (2010).
29We use terms “market”, “consumer” and “buyer” interchangeably.
30We use terms “firm”, “producer” and “seller” interchangeably.
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and similarly Ng(fj) stands for the set of markets linked with fj.
1.4.2 Cournot game
Given a graph g, each firm fj maximizes its profit by supplying non-negative quantities
to the markets in Ng(fj). Thus, the set of strategic players is the set of firms F . Let
qij   0 be the quantity supplied by firm fj to the market di and Qg be the vector
of quantities supplied in graph g. Let r(g) be the size of Qg, and assume we list the
supply qij above the supply qkl when j < l or when j = l and i < k.
A simplified example might help the reader understand the general formulation.
Consider a network with four producers,31 four markets,32 and seven links connecting
them. Out of these four markets, two are importers, market 3 and market 4. Out of
these four producers, two are exporters, producer 1 and producer 2.33
Natural gas carried from producer 1 to market 1 is denoted as q11, from producer
1 to market 3 is denoted as q31, from producer 1 to market 4 is denoted as q41, from
producer 2 to market 2 is denoted as q22, from producer 2 to market 4 is denoted as
q42, from producer 3 to market 3 is denoted as q33 and from producer 4 to market 4
is denoted as q44.
We write the vector of quantities supplied in this graph as:
Qg =
h
q11 q31 q41 q22 q42 q33 q44
i
We assume that markets have linear inverse demand functions. Given a market
di and a flow vector Qg the price, pi, at di is
pi(Qg) = ↵i    ihi, (1.2)
where ↵i and  i are positive constants and hi is natural gas consumption in market
di. More specifically hi is
31They are labeled as 1, 2, 3 and 4.
32They are labeled as 1, 2, 3 and 4.
33The network graph is shown in Figure 1.3.
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Figure 1.3 : A simplified example
hi =
X
fj2Ng(di)
qij. (1.3)
For example, the total consumption in market 4 in the simple network is h4 =
q41 + q42 + q44, leading to linear inverse demand p4 = ↵4    4(q41 + q42 + q44).
We assume that the natural gas producer has zero costs of production in the short
run up to its production capacity, S¯j.34 We also assume that the cost of exporting
natural gas is linear. In the case of LNG, the export cost depends on the exporting
country’s liquefaction cost, the importing country’s regasification cost and the dis-
tance traveled. In the case of pipeline transport, it depends on tariﬀs paid to transit
countries and the length of the pipeline. For firm fj the short-run total cost of supply
therefore is
Tj(Qg) =
X
di2Ng(fj)\dj
⌧ijqij (1.4)
34We assume that the supply capacity is fixed in the short-term because no new wells are drilled.
Our main focus in this study is to capture short-run strategic interactions among the producers. In
the third chapter, we change the model to a two-stage game. In the first stage, a producer chooses
the level of investment for its supply. In the second stage, it decides how much to supply to each
market to which it is connected.
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where ⌧ij is the marginal cost of exporting natural gas to market i.35 If the natural
gas is carried via LNG, ⌧ij includes36 the port-to-port cost of shipment, and the costs
of liquefaction and regasification. If the natural gas is carried via pipeline, ⌧ij includes
tariﬀs paid to transit countries, the cost of fuel lost during transportation, and the
cost of operations and maintenance of the pipeline.
Firm j’s total supply is denoted as sj:
sj =
X
di2Ng(fj)
qij (1.5)
where sj  S¯j. Given a graph Qg and a supply capacity of S¯j, firm j maximizes profit
by choosing qij:37
max
qij
⇡j = max
qij
8<: X
di2Ng(fj)
↵iqij  
X
di2Ng(fj)
 iq
2
ij  
X
di2Ng(fj)
 iqij
X
fk2Ng(di)\fj
qik  
X
di2Ng(fj)\dj
⌧ijqij
9=;
(1.6)
subject to
X
di2Ng(fj)
qij  S¯j (1.7a)
qij   0 for all (i, j) 2 g (1.7b)
We write the Kuhn-Tucker Lagrangian of firm j’s maximization problem as
35We assume that cost of exporting natural gas is proportional to the export volume.
36These costs are per unit of natural gas, that is one Bcm in this chapter.
37For the graph Qg in the simple example, producer 1 maximizes
max
q11,q31,q41
(↵1    1q11)q11 + (↵3    3(q31 + q33))q31 + (↵4    4(q41 + q42 + q44))q41   ⌧31q31   ⌧41q41
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L =
X
di2Ng(fj)
↵iqij  
X
di2Ng(fj)
 iqijhi  
X
di2Ng(fj)\dj
⌧ijqij +  j
0@S¯j   X
di2Ng(fj)
qij
1A
+
X
di2Ng(fj)
µijqij. (1.8)
Then there exists  ?j and µ?ij such that q?ij,  ?j and µ?ij satisfy the following Kuhn-
Tucker optimality conditions:
@L
@qij
= ↵i   ⌧ij    i
0@ X
fk2Ng(di)\fj
qik + 2q
?
ij
1A   j + µj + ◆ij = 0 (1.9a)
@L
@ j
= S¯j  
X
di2Ng(fj)
qij   0 (1.9b)
@L
@µij
= qij   0 (1.9c)
 j
@L
@ j
=  j
0@S¯j   X
di2Ng(fj)
qij
1A = 0 (1.9d)
µij
@L
@µij
= µijqij = 0. (1.9e)
We get the38 Cournot-Nash equilibrium flow of q?ij:
q?ij =
8>>><>>>:
↵i   ⌧ij    j    i
✓ X
fk2Ng(di)\fj
qik
◆
2 i
if @⇡j@qij
  
Qg
  0
0 if @⇡j@qij
  
Qg
< 0
(1.10)
The stylized representation of the current world natural gas market described
above is a non-cooperative game with coupled payoﬀ functions and coupled con-
38Ilkilic (2010) shows that the unconstrained Cournot game in a bipartite graph has a unique
Nash equilibrium.
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straints.39 Although the Lagrangian multiplier theory is widely used to solve nonlin-
ear mathematical programming problems with constraints,40 it is not computationally
convenient to apply it to our model. In particular, we have a large number of first-
order conditions with inequality constraints (one for each producer) that need to be
solved simultaneously. Instead, we use the potential game method. This involves
re-casting our model as a single constrained optimization problem as if it were being
solved by a centralized approach where there is a single agent who searches for the
optimal solution given the constraints.41
Definition 1:Consider the Cournot game that we describe above with linear inverse
demand function42 and linear cost function. Define a function
P ?(Qg) =
X
di2Ng(fj)
↵i
0@ X
fj2Ng(di)
qij
1A  X
di2Ng(fj)
 i
0@ X
fj2Ng(di)
q2ij
1A
 
X
di2Ng(fj)
 i
 X
1j<kn
qijqik
!
 
X
fj2Ng(di)
X
di2Ng(fj)\dj
⌧ijqij (1.11)
subject to
S¯j  
X
di2Ng(fj)
qij for all j 2 F (1.12)
and
39The coupling arises because producers have limited capacity of production to allocate to markets
to which they are connected.
40Among others see Bertsekas (1998), Boyd and Vandeberghe (2004) and Bazaraa, Sherali and
Shetty (1993).
41We note that this is a mathematical device only. We do not assume that there is a single world
authority planning all natural gas trades. In particular, the optimization embeds the eﬃciency costs
of oligopoly. Presumably, if there were a single centralized planner, that agent would choose an
eﬃcient outcome.
42Monderer and Shapley (1994) define a potential function for a Cournot game with linear inverse
demand function. We adapt their functional form to our network Cournot game.
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qij   0 for all (i, j) 2 g. (1.13)
It can be verified that for every link from firm j to market i, that is qij, and for
every link that is not from firm j to market i, that is q ij, P ?(Qg)43 satisfies
⇡j(qij, q ij)  ⇡j(xij, q ij) = P ?(qij, q ij)  P ?(xij, q ij) (1.14)
A function P ? satisfying (1.14) is called a potential function which requires
@⇡j
@qij
=
@P ?
@qij
for all (i, j) 2 g (1.15)
Theorem 1: The solution to the potential game44 defined in (1.11) subject to con-
straints defined in (1.12) and (1.13) is unique:
max
qij
P ?(Qg) for all (i, j) 2 g (1.16)
subject to (1.12) and (1.13).
Proof: See Section (1.8.1).
Theorem 2: The Nash equilibrium of the potential game with constraints defined in
(1.16) and the Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative Cournot game with constraints
defined in (1.6) are the same.
Proof of Theorem 2: Let Q0g be the optimal solution to (1.16). Since Q0g minimizes
LP ? , Q0g minimizes Lj for each player j. Therefore, Q0g is a Nash equilibrium to the
constrained noncooperative game.45
43Here Qg is the vector of quantities in graph g.
44We know that the optimization problem defined in (1.11) is a potential game because it satisfies
(1.14).
45Monderer and Shapley (1996) say that if a game that possesses an ordinal potential (the network
game introduced in this chapter is an exact potential game, which is a subset of ordinal potential
game) is called an ordinal potential game. Clearly, the pure strategy equilibrium set of the Cournot
game coincides with the pure-strategy equilibrium set of the game in which every firm’s profit is
given by ordinal potential.
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1.5 Calibration
In order to quantitatively evaluate diﬀerent policy scenarios, we first need to calibrate
the theoretical model. To calibrate the model parameters, we use the production,
consumption, price and trade flow data in 2009. The price data is obtained from
International Energy Agency’s (IEA) website and other country websites. The data on
production, consumption, and trade flows are obtained from BP’s Statistical Review
of World Energy 2010.
For calibration, we use the first order conditions of our model.
Example: South America’s producer, labeled as 4, aims to 46
max
q14,q24,q44
⇧4(Qg) = max
q14,q24,q44
{p1q14 + p2q24 + p4q44   ⌧14q14   ⌧24q24} (1.17)
subject to
q14 + q24 + q44  S¯4 and q14, q24, q44   0. (1.18)
By considering the links that carry positive flows47 in equilibrium, we get the first
order conditions as:
q14:
↵1   2 1q14    1(q11 + q15 + q16 + q17 + q18)  ⌧14    4   µ14 = 0 (1.19)
q24:
↵2   2 2q24    2(q22 + q25 + q26)  ⌧24    4   µ24 = 0 (1.20)
46As an identifying assumption, we set that the cost of transporting natural gas to the domestic
market as zero.
47According to Ilkilic (2010) links that carry zero flows in equilibrium have no role in determining
the equilibrium.
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q44:
↵4   2 4q44    4   µ44 = 0. (1.21)
We assume an interior solution for the capacity constraint,48 q?14 + q?24 + q?44 < S¯4,
this requires  4 = 0.
We apply the same equilibrium condition to each producer from 1 to 9, and get
twenty one equations.49 The equilibrium price50 in each market is denoted as pˆi.51
Insert Table (1.1) here.
We have 30 unknowns52 and 30 equations to solve for these parameters. We
substitute natural gas production, consumption, trade flow and price data in 2009
into these equations and calculate the parameters.
Insert Table (1.2) here.
Our network parameters are consistent with the world natural gas market experi-
ence in 2009. For instance, although the distance between Russia and the Asia Pacific
is the shortest, the marginal cost of exporting natural gas from Russia and the Asia
Pacific is the highest. This is due to Russia’s limited natural gas production and
liquefaction capacities on Sakhalin Island. On the other hand, the marginal cost of
exporting natural gas from Russia to Europe is the lowest. This result is consistent
with the Rice World Gas Trade Model’s53 (RWGTM) pipeline cost estimate of the
48We make this assumption only when calibrating the parameters. This assumption is realistic
especially in 2009, where due to the global recession, producers had excess supply capacities. When
analyzing alternative scenarios we do not impose this assumption.
49For the rest of the equations see Appendix (1.8.2).
50We use linear inverse demand, which is defined in (1.2).
51Natural gas import prices are usually diﬀerent for each importer and this price diﬀers from the
domestic producer’s price. However, our model assumes that there is a single price of natural gas in
each region, which is determined by the total supply of producers connected to that region.
52These unknowns are ↵i,  i where i = 1, ..., 9 and ⌧ij where there are twelve (i, j) pairs in the
world natural gas network graph.
53The Rice World Gas Trade Model is a tool for examining the eﬀects of economic and political
influences on the global natural gas market within a framework grounded in geologic data and
economic theory.
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Yamal pipeline.54
As depicted in Figure 1.4, North America has the most elastic demand curve
among the importers. This could be because North America has more alternatives to
natural gas than Europe and Asia Pacific.
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Figure 1.4 : Demand Curve of Europe, North America and the Asia Pacific, based
on our calibration.
1.6 Scenario analysis
In this section we analyze various scenarios55 in the world natural gas market by
changing the model’s parameters and/or capacity constraints exogenously. With each
of these changes we optimize a new potential function subject to a new set of con-
straints. We use the sequential quadratic programming algorithm to solve for the
54According to the RWGTM, the marginal cost of carrying natural gas (tariﬀs plus the fuel cost
plus the operating and maintenance of the pipeline) from Yamal to Germany (through Belarus and
Poland) is 74.9 million USD per Bcm.
55Equilibrium trade flows under each scenario are provided in Table (1.3).
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constrained optimum.56
1.6.1 Scenario I: Increased competition between Russia and the Middle
East
According to BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy 1997, about 84 percent of
European natural gas imports came from Russia. Even though there has been a
significant decline57 in LNG transport costs since then, by 2009 Russia was still the
biggest external supplier of European natural gas, with a share of 78 percent.58 How-
ever, Russia’s dominance in the European market is threatened by developments in
Qatar,59 and the concomitant doubling in LNG import capability in Europe since
2000.60 From 2000 to 2009, Middle East exports to Europe increased from 0.84 Bcm
to 25.6 Bcm. Nevertheless, Russia’s dominance of the European natural gas market
persists.
To reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas, an alternative pipeline
route, Nabucco, was proposed a decade ago. The goal was to connect European
consumers to natural gas resources in the Caspian Sea area. Unlike the Nabucco
pipeline project as originally proposed, we assume that a Nabucco pipeline would
connect the Middle East and Europe.61
We incorporate this scenario in our model by using the RWGTM’s cost estima-
56More specifically, we use fmincon from MATLAB’s optimization toolbox, which finds the min-
imum of a constrained nonlinear multivariable function. To obtain the maximum, we minimize (-1)
times the potential function.
57For more details see The Global Liquefied Natural Gas Market: Status and Outlook, 2003.
58These claims are based on calculations using BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy 2010’s
natural gas trade data.
59According to Dargin (2007), Qatar became the world’s leading LNG exporter in 2006.
60See Medlock, Jaﬀe and Hartley (2011).
61In our model, countries around the Caspian Sea are considered to be part of the Russia super-
region. Since the original Nabucco pipeline was proposed, analysts have questioned whether reserves
in the Caspian region are not large enough to cover the capital cost of building a pipeline to Europe.
On the other hand, developments in Iraq in particular have raised the possibility that the Middle
East could become a large supplier of natural gas to Europe via pipeline.
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tion62 for Nabucco. The Nabucco route is assumed to go from Iraq to Istanbul,
Istanbul to Bulgaria, then Bulgaria to Austria. We get the marginal cost of export-
ing to Europe by taking the weighted average of marginal costs of exporting natural
gas to Europe via Nabucco and via LNG.63
We assume that 20 percent64 of natural gas from the Middle East to Europe is
carried via Nabucco and 80 percent is carried via LNG. With 20 percent via pipeline,
the marginal cost of exporting one Bcm of natural gas from the Middle East to Europe
decreases to 235.97 million USD. With this reduction, the Middle East increases its
supply to Europe from 25.6 Bcm to 48.32 Bcm; decreases its supply to the Asia
Pacific from 47.20 Bcm to 41.4 Bcm; and decreases its domestic market supply from
345.54 Bcm to 328.67 Bcm. The Middle East’s share in Europe’s natural gas imports
increases from 3.09 percent to 5.83 percent. Europe’s share in the Middle East’s
total production increases from 6.11 percent to 11.5 percent. When Nabucco is built,
there will be more competition in the European market for all producers that are
connected to it: Europe, South America, West Africa, North Africa, and Russia.
They will decrease their supply to Europe to avoid further decline in the equilibrium
natural gas price in Europe.
Contrary to the eﬀects in Europe, the decline in supply from the Middle East
will result in less competition in the Asia Pacific. As a result, West Africa, Russia,
and Australasia will increase their supplies to the Asia Pacific. In the equilibrium,
Russia’s supply to the Asia Pacific increases from 6.2 Bcm to 7.9 Bcm; West Africa’s
supply to the Asia Pacific increases from 6.59 Bcm to 8.31 Bcm; and Australasia’s
supply to the Asia Pacific increases from 88.29 Bcm to 88.94 Bcm. The increase in
62We consider tariﬀs paid to transit countries plus the operating and maintenance costs. We
ignore the capital cost as it is another decision problem which is beyond the motivation of this
chapter.
63The cost of exporting natural gas via LNG is calibrated in the previous section.
64We also look at diﬀerent scenarios such as: 30 percent is carried via pipeline and 70 percent is
carried via LNG, and 50 percent is carried via pipeline and 50 percent is carried via LNG. The sign
of changes in these scenarios are the same as in the case where 20 percent is carried via pipeline and
80 percent is carried via LNG, but the magnitudes are diﬀerent. For instance, Middle East’s supply
to Europe is bigger when 50 percent of its exports are carried via pipeline.
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supply from Russia and West Africa is greater than the increase from Australasia
because the former two regions reap larger marginal profits than does Australasia
from supplying the Asia Pacific region.
Under this scenario, equilibrium total supply to Europe goes from 580.3 Bcm to
584.9 Bcm, which decreases the equilibrium price in Europe from 300 million USD
per Bcm to 296 million USD per Bcm. On the other hand, equilibrium total supply
to the Asia Pacific declines from 394.39 Bcm to 392.96 Bcm, which increases the
equilibrium price in the Asia Pacific from 320 million USD per Bcm to 322 million
USD per Bcm. Neither the equilibrium price nor the equilibrium consumption changes
in North America, since there is no change in the equilibrium supply to it.
Under this scenario, profits of the Asia Pacific, Middle East, and Australasia
producers increase. Profits of North American producers stay the same and the
profits of the remaining producers decrease. Both the Asia Pacific and Australasia
have higher profits due to the increase in equilibrium price in the Asia Pacific. Europe,
South America, West Africa, North Africa, and Russia have lower profits since their
market shares, as well as the equilibrium price in Europe, decline.
In a variant of the Nabucco case we simply increase Middle East supply capacity by
10 percent while leaving transport costs to Europe unchanged. In the new equilibrium,
the Middle East increases its supply to Europe without decreasing supply to the Asia
Pacific or its domestic market.
1.6.2 Scenario II: Decreased competition between Russia and the Middle
East
This scenario assumes that Russia and the Middle East collude to maximize their
joint profits. Via such collusion they increase their market power in both markets
they share and, hence, their joint profits increase.
Given the natural gas network we had in 2009, suppose Russia and the Middle
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East65 merge to maximize their joint profit, which is:
⇧78(Qg) =↵1(q17 + q18)   1(q11 + q14 + q15 + q16 + q17 + q18)(q17 + q18) + ↵3(q37 + q38)
   3(q33 + q35 + q37 + q38 + q39)(q37 + q38)  ⌧17q17   ⌧18q18   ⌧37q37   ⌧38q38
(1.22)
subject to
q17 + q37 + q77  S¯7 , q18 + q38 + q88  S¯8 and q17, q37, q77, q18, q38, q88   0.
(1.23)
The graph of this new network is:
Figure 1.5 : Schematic representation after Russia and the Middle East merger
We optimize the new potential function subject to supply constraints. After the
merger, Russia and the Middle East reduce their combined output and their equilib-
rium supplies to each of the markets that they share, Europe and the Asia Pacific.
The new equilibrium outcome is that the links from Russia to the Asia Pacific and
from the Middle East to Europe carry zero flows, meaning that Russia specializes
in the European market and the Middle East specializes in the Asia Pacific. This
occurs because Russia has a lower marginal cost of exporting natural gas to Europe,
65We label Russia and the Middle East after the merger as 78.
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while the Middle East has a lower marginal cost of exporting natural gas to the Asia
Pacific.
The equilibrium supply of Russia and the Middle East to Europe decreases to
187.75 Bcm. The pre-merger supply from Russia to Europe was 181.1 Bcm and from
the Middle East to Europe was 25.6 Bcm. Similarly, the equilibrium supply of Russia
and the Middle East to the Asia Pacific is 49.84 Bcm after the merger. The pre-
merger supply from Russia to the Asia Pacific was 6.2 Bcm and from the Middle
East to the Asia Pacific was 47.19 Bcm. As a result of the collusion, prices rise in
both Europe and the Asia Pacific. In the new equilibrium, total supply to Europe
decreases from 580.3 Bcm to 573.54 Bcm, which increases the equilibrium price from
300 million USD per Bcm to 307.03 million USD per Bcm. In the new equilibrium,
total supply to the Asia Pacific decreases from 394.39 Bcm to 391.74 Bcm, which
increases the equilibrium price in the Asia Pacific from 320 million USD per Bcm to
323.2 million USD per Bcm.
As these equilibrium outcomes indicate, the attempt to exploit consumers in Eu-
rope and the Asia Pacific via collusion is thwarted to some extent by other suppliers.
South America, West Africa, and North Africa all increase their supply to Europe
by decreasing their supply to North America and to their domestic markets. For
instance, West Africa decreases its equilibrium supply to North America from 3.1
Bcm to zero and decreases its equilibrium supply to the Asia Pacific from 6.6 Bcm to
6.51 Bcm. Similarly, North Africa decreases its supply to North America from 5 Bcm
to 1.46 Bcm in order to increase its supply to Europe. After the collusive merger,
the marginal profit of supplying to North America declines for all producers that are
connected to it.
The equilibrium prices after the merger increase in each market except Russia and
the Middle East66 due to a decline in equilibrium supply. For instance, the equilibrium
supply to North America declines from 828.7 Bcm to 818.86 Bcm, and the equilibrium
66In the latter two markets they remain at the pre-merger level.
24
price increases from 150 million USD per Bcm to 151.816 million USD per Bcm.
The joint profit of Russia and the Middle East after the merger increases by 2.18
billion USD. Although this provides an incentive for Russia and the Middle East to
merge, it is a weak one. Furthermore, the stability of such a collusion is hard to
maintain since both parties would retain an incentive to “cheat” by reneging on a
commitment to refrain from selling to their partner’s exclusive market area.
As a further modification to the Russia and Middle East collusion, we increase
North America’s supply capacity by 5 percent and increase the marginal cost of ex-
porting natural gas to it by 2 percent.67 These changes make, the merger of Russia
and the Middle East even less profitable (compared to no shale with collusion sce-
nario). Due to the decline in import demand of North America, all exporters that
are connected to it move their resources to other markets, that is, Europe, the Asia
Pacific, and their domestic markets. Hence, Russia and Middle East’s market power
is reduced.
1.6.3 Scenario III: An increase in Asia Pacific’s natural gas demand
According to the IEA’s 2010 World Energy Outlook, China’s demand for natural gas
has recently grown faster than demand in any other region. In fact, it is projected to
grow at an average of almost 6 percent per year 2008-2035. The IEA report projects
that from 2008 to 2015, Asia’s demand will grow from 341 Bcm to 497 Bcm a year.
In addition to demand growth from China and India, Japan’s demand for natural
gas has increased after the Fukushima nuclear disaster. According to the IEA’s 2011
World Energy Outlook, the Fukushima disaster could lead to a 15 percent fall in world
nuclear power generation by 2035, when power demand may be 3.1 percent higher.
This will raise gas-fired power generation along with other types of generation. The
incremental demand for LNG in Japan’s power sector in 2011 was expected to be 11
Bcm, according to the IEA report.
67These changes are a simple way of representing the depressing eﬀects on North American
imports of increased shale gas production.
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The demand increase expected in the 2011 report is incorporated in our model by
increasing the choke price in the Asia Pacific by 5 percent. With a 5 percent increase
in the choke price, natural gas demand in the Asia Pacific increases by 32.02 Bcm,
which corresponds to an 8.12 percent increase in demand at the 2009 price in the
Asia Pacific. All of the producers that are connected to the Asia Pacific respond to
the demand increase by shifting supply from other markets to the Asia Pacific.
West Africa increases its supply to the Asia Pacific from 6.59 Bcm to 12.25 Bcm,
decreases its supply to Europe from 10.7 Bcm to 8.34 Bcm and stops supplying North
America in equilibrium. This is because the marginal profit of supplying to the Asia
Pacific is greater than the marginal profit of supplying to Europe, North America,
and to West Africa’s domestic market.
Similarly, an upward shift in Asia Pacific’s demand curve increases Russia’s supply
to the Asia Pacific from 6.2 Bcm to 13.65 Bcm and decreases Russia’s supply to its
domestic market from 485.43 Bcm to 478.13 Bcm. Russia thus meets most of its
additional supply to the Asia Pacific from supplies to its domestic market. The share
of Russia’s supply to the Asia Pacific over its total production increases from 0.9
percent to 2 percent, whereas the share of its domestic market decreases from 72.2
percent to 71.1 percent.
With a 5 percent increase in Asia Pacific’s choke price, the Middle East’s supply
to the Asia Pacific increases from 47.19 Bcm to 53.78 Bcm. This is achieved via a
5.34 Bcm cut in supply to its domestic market and a 1.19 Bcm reduction in its supply
to Europe. The Asia Pacific’s total consumption of natural gas from the Middle East
increases by 0.9 percent.
As a result of an increase in Asia Pacific’s demand, West Africa, Russia, and
the Middle East decrease their supply to Europe, which makes the European market
more attractive for South America and North Africa. In response, they decrease their
supply to North America and their domestic markets.
The total consumption in each region except the Asia Pacific declines. The equilib-
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rium price in these regions increases due to decline in equilibrium supply. Although
the equilibrium supply to the Asia Pacific increases, the equilibrium price also in-
creases due to the shift in demand for natural gas. Profits of each producer increase
due to the increase in natural gas prices.
1.6.4 Scenario IV: Increase in importers’ natural gas demand
We assume that the choke price in Europe, North America and the Asia Pacific
increases by 2 percent. With this change, natural gas demand at 2009 prices increases
by 3.02 percent in Europe, by 4.24 percent in North America, and by 3.3 percent in
the Asia Pacific. We analyze world natural gas demand increase in two cases: with
shale gas and without shale gas.
Without shale gas:
Following the increase in the choke price in importing countries, the marginal profit
of exporting increases for each producer. Thus, they reduce their equilibrium supply
to their domestic markets and increase their supply to abroad.
In the 2009 world natural gas trade network, West Africa is the only producer
connected to all three importing markets. Under this scenario, West Africa increases
its supply to Europe and the Asia Pacific and decreases its supply to North America,
even though the demand in all three markets increases.
On the other hand, the rest of the producers increase their exports by decreasing
their supply to their domestic markets. For instance, South America increases its
equilibrium supply to Europe from 7.6 Bcm to 8.82 Bcm, increases its equilibrium
supply to North America from 7.6 Bcm to 9.21 Bcm, and decreases its equilibrium
supply to its domestic market from 134.7 Bcm to 131.86 Bcm.
Similarly, North Africa increases its equilibrium supply to Europe from 67.2 Bcm
to 68.28 Bcm, and increases its equilibrium supply to North America from 4.99 Bcm
to 5.85 Bcm.
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Under this scenario, total supplies to Europe, North America, and the Asia Pacific
increase. Due to the increase in demand, the equilibrium price in Europe, North
America, and the Asia Pacific increases.68
The profit of each producer increases as the equilibrium prices in their domestic
markets and abroad increase.
With shale gas:
We assume that, simultaneous with the demand increase, North America’s supply
capacity increases by 5 percent and the marginal cost of exporting natural gas to
North America increases by 2 percent. These exogenous changes mimic the decrease
in the import demand of North America resulting from the exploitation of shale gas.
Due to the decrease in North American import demand the producers connected
to North America move their exports to Europe and the Asia Pacific. The market
share of Russia, the Middle East, and Australasia decrease in Europe and the Asia
Pacific compared to the no shale gas scenario. For instance, if there is no shale gas,
Russia supplies 185.58 Bcm to Europe but with shale gas, it supplies 184.05 Bcm.
Similarly, the Middle East’s supply to Europe declines from 28.92 Bcm to 27.67 Bcm.
The impact of shale gas development in North America is greater in Europe than in
the Asia Pacific since Europe and North America share more producers than the Asia
Pacific and North America.
Equilibrium prices in Europe, North America, and the Asia Pacific are lower than
the ones under the no shale gas production scenario. However, they are higher than
the prices in 2009 due to the concomitant increase in natural gas demand. With
shale gas development, North America’s total consumption increases from 830.3 Bcm
to 840.92 Bcm and imports decrease from 17.3 Bcm to 7.3 Bcm. North America’s
68The equilibrium price in Europe increases from 300 million USD per Bcm to 306.73 million
USD per Bcm, in North America it increases from 150 million USD per Bcm to 155.76 million USD
per Bcm and in the Asia Pacific it increases from 320 million USD per Bcm to 326.38 million USD
per Bcm.
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profit increases after the shale gas development while the rest of the producers make
losses compared to a demand increase with no shale gas scenario.
1.6.5 Scenario V: Russia to China pipeline
In this scenario we assume that Western Siberia and China are connected through
a pipeline. To incorporate this scenario into our model we use the Rice World Gas
Trade Model’s cost estimations for pipeline routes from Surgut to Urengoy, from West
Siberia to China, from West China to Xian, and from Xian to Shanghai. We assume
that 30 percent of natural gas from Russia to Asia Pacific is carried via pipeline and
70 percent is carried via LNG. We get the marginal costs of exporting natural gas to
the Asia Pacific by taking the weighted average of marginal costs of exporting natural
gas to the Asia Pacific via pipeline and via LNG.
If 30 percent of natural gas is carried via pipeline, then the marginal cost of
exporting one Bcm of natural gas from Russia to the Asia Pacific decreases to 237.22
USD. With this reduction, Russia increases its supply to the Asia Pacific from 6.19
Bcm to 47.83 Bcm, decreases its supply to Europe from 181.1 Bcm to 173.86 Bcm,
and decreases its domestic market supply from 485.43 Bcm to 451.09 Bcm. Russia’s
share in the Asia Pacific’s imports increases from 3.7 percent to 32.25 percent. This
increases the competition in the Asia Pacific for the Asia Pacific, West Africa, the
Middle East, and Australasia. For that reason, they decrease their supply to the Asia
Pacific. For instance, in the new equilibrium Australasia’s supply to the Asia Pacific
decreases from 88.29 Bcm to 79.54 Bcm and West Africa does not supply the Asia
Pacific.
Under this scenario, the Middle East’s equilibrium supply to the Asia Pacific
decreases from 47.19 Bcm to 38.44 Bcm and its supply to Europe increases from 25.6
Bcm to 27.2 Bcm.
The decrease in natural gas supply from Russia to Europe decreases the competi-
tion in the European market. As a result, the marginal profit of supplying to Europe
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increases for South America, West Africa, North Africa, and the Middle East. For
instance, South America’s supply to Europe increases from 7.6 Bcm to 8.82 Bcm,
West Africa’s supply to Europe increases from 10.7 Bcm to 12.3 Bcm, and North
Africa’s supply to Europe increases from 67.2 Bcm to 68.42 Bcm. South America and
North Africa decrease their supply to North America and to their domestic markets
in order to supply more to Europe.
Under this scenario, equilibrium total supply to Europe decreases from 580.3 Bcm
to 578.7 Bcm, which increases the equilibrium price in Europe from 300 million USD
per Bcm to 301.66 million USD per Bcm. However, the equilibrium total supply
to the Asia Pacific increases from 394.4 Bcm to 403.15 Bcm, and this decreases the
equilibrium price in the Asia Pacific from 320 million USD per Bcm to 308.61 million
USD per Bcm. The equilibrium price in North America increases by 0.19 million
USD per Bcm as the total supply to North America decreases by 1.06 Bcm. Russia’s
natural gas prices in its domestic market increase due to the increased exports. They
produce a decline in domestic market consumption.
Russia’s profits increase from 65.76 billion USD to 67.89 billion USD, North Amer-
ica’s profits increase from 121.95 billion USD to 122.11 billion USD, and the rest of
the producers’ profits decrease. The Asia Pacific has the biggest profit loss among
remaining producers69 because both its market share in the Asia Pacific and the
equilibrium natural gas price in its domestic market decline.
1.6.6 Scenario VI: Russia to China pipeline and Nabucco
In this section, we consider the case where Russia has a pipeline connection to the
Asia Pacific and the Middle East has a pipeline connection to Europe. We compare
these results with the results in 1.6.1.70
69Its profits decrease by 7.5 billion USD.
70That is the scenario where we considered increased competition between Russia and Middle
East in the European market via a pipeline connection from the Middle East to Europe.
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Under this scenario, Russia increases supply to the Asia Pacific to 49.35 Bcm,
which is 1.51 Bcm higher than the scenario where there is only a Russia-China
pipeline71 and 41.43 Bcm higher than the case where there is only Nabucco. Rus-
sia’s equilibrium supply to Europe is 169.93 Bcm; however, its equilibrium supply to
Europe is 177.31 Bcm under the scenario where there is only Nabucco. The Middle
East increases its supply to Europe to 51.54 Bcm, which is 3.22 Bcm higher than the
scenario where there is only Nabucco and 24.35 Bcm higher than the scenario where
there is only a Russian pipeline.
Under this scenario, Europe’s, South America’s, and North Africa’s supplies to
Europe are higher than the scenario where there is only Nabucco. in equilibrium,
West Africa does not supply to the Asia Pacific.
Under this scenario, Russia’s profits are higher than its profits in 2009 and its
profits when there is Nabucco only. It is in Russia’s best interest to have a Russia-
China pipeline when there is Nabucco.
1.7 Conclusions
This chapter presented a network model of the world natural gas market that con-
sists of consumers, producers (which are represented as strategic Cournot players),
and links connecting them. We calibrated the model parameters using natural gas
consumption, production, trade, and price data in 2009. The model allowed us to
quantify the strategic interactions among natural gas producers.
We find that if a natural gas producer has access72 to a market then its market
power at that market depends on its production capacity and its costs of exporting
natural gas. For instance, Russia’s market power in the Asia Pacific is low because
of its high costs of exporting natural gas from Sakhalin island to Japan.
71The decrease in the Middle East’s cost of exporting natural gas to Europe will increase Middle
East’s exports to Europe making the European market more competitive for Russia.
72If it does not have access then its market power is zero.
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We also find that any exogenous change aﬀecting one market impacts all other
markets. The size of the impact on any one market also declines as the number of
links connecting markets increases.
Although the establishment of a single (or a reference) price for natural gas is
diﬃcult to achieve due to the high cost of transport and long-term contracts over 20-
25 years with prices indexed to oil, our model confirms that with the developments
in LNG technology and growing diversity in supply sources and new demand sinks,
natural gas has been evolving into a global commodity with some convergence in
regional prices.
1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof follows Zhu (2008) which introduces the game as minimization problem.
Corollary 2.8 in Zhu (2008) says that every strictly convex potential game admits a
unique equilibrium. We therefore show that ( 1) ⇥ our potential function, ( 1) ⇥
P ?(Qg) = f(Qg) is strictly convex in each qij for all (i, j) 2 Ng.
Now f : Rr(g) ! R where r(g) is the size of Qg, which is the number of links in
the network graph of Qg. It is well-known that f is strictly convex if and only if its
Hessian is positive definite.
Notation for defining the Hessian of f : We use Ilkilic’s (2010) notation for la-
beling links in a bipartite graph. We define firm j’s supply to the domestic market
as qjj.
Let ⇢ : L  N+ be a lexicographic order on L respecting ◆73 such that ⇢ relabels
the (i, j) pairs from 1 to r(g) by skipping those links which are not in g. The function
⇢ satisfies the following conditions:
73We will order all possible links such that the links of a firm fj are assigned a lower number
than any firm fi for i > j, and the links of a firm are ordered according to the indices of the markets
they are connected. The label of a possible link (i, j) will be denoted by ◆(i, j).
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1. 9(i, j) 2 L such that ⇢(i, j) = 1,
2. (i, j) 6= (k, l) =) ⇢(i, j) 6= ⇢(k, l),
3. j  l =) ⇢(i, j)  ⇢(k, l) for all (i, j), (k, l) 2 L,
4. i  k =) ⇢(i, j)  ⇢(k, j) for all (i, j), (k, l) 2 L,
5. If 9(i, j) s.t. ⇢(i, j) = z   1 then 9(k, l) 2 L s.t. ⇢(k, l) = z   1.
Given a network g and for t = ⇠(i, j), the Hessian matrix of the potential function,
H = [gtz]r(g)⇥r(g) is
gtz =
8>>><>>>:
2 i, if t = z = ⇠(i, j) for somemi 2M , fj 2 F
 i, if t 6= z , t = ⇠(i, j) , z = ⇠(i, k) for somemi 2M , fj ,fk 2 F
0, otherwise.
Next, we show that for any matrix H we can find a matrix R with independent
columns such that H = RTR, which is equivalent to checking that H is positive
definite.
Create a diagonal matrix, H˙, of size r(g) ⇥ r(g) with diagonal elements equal to
square root of
1
2
⇥ the corresponding diagonal element of H for those rows that have
non-zero non-diagonal elements and diagonal elements equal to 2⇥ the corresponding
diagonal element of H for those rows that have only zero non-diagonal elements.
Then, create a matrix, H˜, of size equal to (number of non-zero non-diagonal
elements in the upper triangular of H divided by 2)⇥r(g)74. Row l of H˜ is filled by:
glk =
8<:
p
 i, for all columns k = 1, 2, ..., r(g) where⇢ 1(k) = qij if they share marketmi
0, otherwise.
Apply this to all rows l in H˜. The final step involves combining the matrices
H˙ and H˜ by their rows to obtain a matrix R with a size of (number of non-zero
74Ignore the rows of H that have zero non-diagonal elements.
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non-diagonal elements in the upper triangular of H divided by 2)+ r(g)⇥ r(g). One
can easily show that H = RTR which completes the proof. Finally, the constraints in
this problem are linear, which satisfies the requirement in Theorem 2.3 in Zhu (2008)
that they have to be convex.
Example: Here is the Hessian, H and the matrix, R in the simple example network
provided in the chapter.
We write the vector of quantities supplied in this graph as:
Qg =
h
q11 q31 q41 q22 q42 q33 q44
i
H =
26666666666666664
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 2 3 0 0 0  3 0
0 0 2 4 0  4 0  4
0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0
0 0  4 0 2 4 0  4
0  3 0 0 0 2 3 0
0 0  4 0  4 0 2 4
37777777777777775
and
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H˙ =
26666666666666664
p
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
p
 3 0 0 0 0 0
0 0
p
 4 0 0 0 0
0 0 0
p
2 2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
p
 4 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
p
 3 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
p
 4
37777777777777775
H˜ =
24 0 p 3 0 0 0 p 3 0
0 0
p
 4 0
p
 4 0
p
 4
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We combine the matrices H˙ and H˜ by their rows to obtain:
R =
26666666666666666666664
p
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
p
 3 0 0 0 0 0
0 0
p
 4 0 0 0 0
0 0 0
p
2 2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
p
 4 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
p
 3 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
p
 4
0
p
 3 0 0 0
p
 3 0
0 0
p
 4 0
p
 4 0
p
 4
37777777777777777777775
1.8.2 First order conditions for calibration
The first order conditions that are used in calibration:
Europe:
↵1   2 1q11    1(q14 + q15 + q16 + q17 + q18)   1   µ11 = 0
North America:
↵2   2 2q22    2(q24 + q25 + q26)   2   µ22 = 0
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Asia Pacific:
↵3   2 3q33    3(q35 + q37 + q38 + q39)   3   µ33 = 0
West Africa:
↵1   2 1q15    1(q11 + q14 + q16 + q17 + q18)  ⌧15    5   µ15 = 0
↵2   2 2q25    2(q22 + q24 + q26)  ⌧25    5   µ25 = 0
↵3   2 3q35    3(q33 + q37 + q38 + q39)  ⌧35    5   µ35 = 0
↵5   2 5q55    5   µ55 = 0
North Africa:
↵1   2 1q16    1(q11 + q14 + q15 + q17 + q18)  ⌧16    6   µ16 = 0
↵2   2 2q26    2(q22 + q24 + q25)  ⌧26    6   µ26 = 0
↵6   2 6q66    6   µ66 = 0
Russia:
↵1   2 1q17    1(q11 + q14 + q15 + q16 + q18)  ⌧17    7   µ17 = 0
↵3   2 3q37    3(q33 + q35 + q38 + q39)  ⌧37    7   µ37 = 0
↵7   2 7q77    7   µ77 = 0
Middle East:
↵1   2 1q18    1(q11 + q14 + q15 + q16 + q18)  ⌧18    8   µ18 = 0
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↵3   2 3q38    3(q33 + q35 + q37 + q39)  ⌧38    8   µ38 = 0
↵8   2 8q88    8   µ88 = 0
Australasia:
↵3   2 3q39    3(q33 + q35 + q37 + q38)  ⌧39    9   µ39 = 0
↵9   2 9q99    9   µ99 = 0
Table 1.1 : Price in each market
Price in Europe: pˆ1 = ↵1    1(q11 + q14 + q15 + q16 + q17 + q18)
Price in North America: pˆ2 = ↵2    2(q22 + q24 + q25 + q26)
Price in Asia Pacific: pˆ3 = ↵3    3(q33 + q35 + q37 + q38 + q39)
Price in South America: pˆ4 = ↵4    4q44
Price in West Africa: pˆ5 = ↵5    5q55
Price in North Africa: pˆ6 = ↵6    6q66
Price in Russia: pˆ7 = ↵7    7q77
Price in Middle East: pˆ8 = ↵8    8q88
Price in Australasia: pˆ9 = ↵9    9q99
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Table 1.2 : Network parameters
Parameter Value
Choke price in Europe: ↵1 904.27
Choke price in North America: ↵2 302.9
Choke price in Asia Pacific: ↵3 832.83
Choke price in South America: ↵4 260.02
Choke price in West Africa: ↵5 220.01
Choke price in North Africa: ↵6 199.97
Choke price in Russia: ↵7 130.03
Choke price in Middle East: ↵8 200.01
Choke price in Australasia: ↵9 239.99
Slope of European inverse demand curve:  1 1.041
Slope of North America’s inverse demand curve:  2 0.184
Slope of Asia Pacific’s inverse demand curve:  3 1.3003
Slope of South America’s inverse demand curve:  4 0.965
Slope of West Africa’s inverse demand curve:  5 10.912
Slope of North Africa’s inverse demand curve:  6 1.445
Slope of Russian inverse demand curve:  7 0.134
Slope of Middle East’s inverse demand curve:  8 0.2894
Slope of Australasian inverse demand curve:  9 1.083
Marginal cost of exporting from South America to Europe: ⌧14 292.08
Marginal cost of exporting from South America to North America: ⌧24 148.59
Marginal cost of exporting from West Africa to Europe: ⌧15 288.85
Marginal cost of exporting from West Africa to North America: ⌧25 149.43
Marginal cost of exporting from West Africa to Asia Pacific: ⌧35 311.41
Marginal cost of exporting from North Africa to Europe: ⌧16 230.02
Marginal cost of exporting from North Africa to North America: ⌧26 149.07
Marginal cost of exporting from Russia to Europe: ⌧17 111.41
Marginal cost of exporting from Russia to Asia Pacific: ⌧37 311.93
Marginal cost of exporting from Middle East to Europe: ⌧18 273.34
Marginal cost of exporting from Middle East to Asia Pacific: ⌧38 258.62
Marginal cost of exporting from Australasia to Asia Pacific: ⌧39 205.18
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Chapter 2
Eﬀects of North American shale gas on world
natural gas markets
2.1 Introduction
Recent developments in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling have changed the
course of natural gas trade for the U.S. Until a decade ago, market players were
investing in LNG import facilities in the U.S., based on the predictions that U.S.
domestic supply was becoming scarce. Contrary to these predictions, recent techno-
logical developments have unlocked natural gas resources and enabled a rapid growth
of natural gas production in the U.S. For instance, according to the Energy Infor-
mation Administration (EIA), gross withdrawals from shale gas wells in the U.S. has
increased from zero in 2000 to over 23 billion cubic feet per day (Bcfd) in 2011, repre-
senting over 29 percent of total gross production in the U.S. These abundant supplies
and the consequent low prices in the U.S. relative to the European and Asia Pacific
markets have led natural gas producers to look at the profit opportunities from ex-
porting to these markets. This chapter focuses on the possible impacts on domestic
and international gas prices of U.S. natural gas exports.
As stated in the first chapter, most world natural gas production is concentrated
in a small number of producers. However, following the Natural Gas Policy Act in
1978, the U.S. has developed the most liberalized natural gas market with a large
number of producers of whom each has easy access to a huge market. In particular,
ownership of transportation capacity rights is unbundled from pipeline ownership.
Unbundling of capacity rights from facility ownership makes it possible for any pro-
ducer to access markets through a competitive bid. By contrast, in most other markets
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globally, pipeline capacity is not unbundled from facility ownership, meaning large
incumbent monopolies can eﬀectively present barriers to entry through control of the
transportation infrastructure.1 We therefore consider a mixed oligopoly competitive
model2 of the world natural gas market, where we allow for OPEC type3 of competi-
tion where there are dominant producers facing a fringe of small competitors, albeit
largely confined to North America. In reality, small firms are also part of the market
in some overseas jurisdictions, especially Australia, but for simplicity we assume the
competitive fringe is present only in North America.
We model the world natural gas market in a network structure where buyers
and sellers are connected through a trading network. We base our model on Ilkilic
(2010), who develops a bipartite network model for m markets and n firms in Cournot
competition and analyzes how the structure of network that connects suppliers with
producers aﬀects the market outcome. In this chapter, we relax Ilkilic’s (2010) as-
sumption that each producer is a Cournot player and has no capacity constraint.
To better represent the North American natural gas market, this chapter allows for
perfect competition in that market. We show that our game can be represented as a
potential game and with a unique equilibrium.
In this chapter, we add more links to the world natural gas trade network that we
introduced in the first chapter, but we still assume that the network graph is fixed.
More specifically, we allow for buyers and sellers to be connected if the seller has a
liquefaction facility and the buyer has a regasification facility. For instance in 2009,
there was no natural gas trade between Trinidad and Tobago and Japan4 but we
1See the section by Medlock in “2013 Policy Recommendations for the Obama Administration”
by the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, March 2013.
2The literature uses “mixed oligopoly” to refer to a market with public and private firms, where
the public firms maximize social welfare and private firms maximize their profits. In this chapter,
we introduce a new term “mixed oligopoly competitive” to define a market which has a mix of
competitive, monopolistic, monopsonistic and oligopolistic elements.
3Our model diﬀers from the most common model of OPEC, which assumes there is a single
dominant producer that is OPEC. Unlike in the oil market, in the world natural gas market a few
dominant producers compete with each other.
4In our aggregated regions, Trinidad and Tobago belongs to South America and Japan belongs
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allow for a link that connects South America to the Asia Pacific. We do not assume
any exogenous trade volumes and instead let our model solve for equilibrium trade
volumes. As a result, in the equilibrium there might be links that carry zero flows
but they are strategically redundant.5
The literature on North American natural gas exports is very recent. Therefore,
there are few studies that we can compare with ours. In January 2012, the U.S.
Energy Information Administration (EIA) published a study on the price impacts of
U.S. LNG exports. Their analysis treated U.S. LNG exports as exogenous and did not
consider potential interactions between the U.S. LNG exports and the world natural
gas market. Similar to the EIA’s report, a Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions’
study titled “Made in America: The Economic Impact of LNG Exports from the
United States” assumed a particular volume of LNG exports from the U.S. when
assessing the domestic price impact. It also did not allow any interaction between
domestic and international markets to influence the volume of trade.
Contrary to these studies, Medlock (2012) suggested that one should consider U.S.
LNG exports in a global setting and model them in an international trade framework.
According to Medlock (2012), key factors that determine the impact of U.S. LNG
exports on domestic prices are the elasticity of domestic supply and demand, the
elasticity of foreign supply and demand, the role of short-term capacity constraints,
the cost of developing and utilizing export capacity and the exchange rate. Most of
these factors were ignored in the previous studies. His analysis, using the Rice World
Gas Trade Model (RWGTM), concluded that the natural gas spot price diﬀerentials
between Asia and the U.S. and Europe and the U.S. are not suﬃcient to support
long-term LNG exports from the U.S. Gulf Coast to these regions.
Shortly after Medlock (2012), in December 2012, the U.S. Department of En-
to the Asia Pacific.
5Theorem 2 of Ilkilic (2010) tells us that the links which carry no flows in the equilibrium are
strategically redundant; they play no role in determining the equilibrium. For the firms of such links,
the marginal profits of supplying via them are not positive. They are indiﬀerent between having
such a link or not.
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ergy has published another study6 titled “Macroeconomic Impacts of LNG Exports
from the United States” which assesses the potential macroeconomic impacts of LNG
exports. Compared to the previous studies, the DOE study considered the world nat-
ural gas market in a global setting but failed to model it realistically. Specifically,
they assumed that the world natural gas market had a single dominant supplier, with
the largest share of LNG exports. The dominant supplier was assumed to limit out-
put, but had to contend with competitive fringe whose production adjusts to market
prices. Their calculations of U.S. benefits from LNG exports assumed that the dom-
inant supplier would not change its plan for expanding production to counter U.S.
entry to market. Therefore, they concluded that there will be demand for U.S. LNG
exports.
Like the EIA (2012) paper and unlike the RWGTM, we assume that the world
natural gas market is imperfectly competitive. However, we allow all production,
consumption, trade and pricing outcomes to be endogenous. In particular, to the
best of our knowledge, this is the first explicit non-competitive model, where export
volumes from North America and their price impacts are endogenous.7
We find that North American LNG exports occur when its elasticity of supply is
very high and Asian demand remains strong.8,9 The volume of natural gas that North
America exports decrease as its competitors’ elasticities of supply increase. We also
find that a more elastic North American supply curve reduces natural gas producers’
market power all around the world.
In Section 2.2, we introduce our schematic representation of the world natural
6This study was done by NERA Economic Consulting at the request of the U.S. Department of
Energy, Oﬃce of Fossil Energy.
7The RWGTM has endogenous export volumes and prices, but it is competitive.
8More explicitly, we show that North America exports LNG when the North American supply
curve is at least 75 percent flatter than its original supply curve in 2009 and Asia Pacific’s demand
is increased by at least 15 percent relative to 2009.
9An unrealistic feature of our model is that North America does not export and import at the
same time. This is because we assume a single price for the North American market. However, in
reality due to pipeline capacity constraints it can export LNG from the Gulf Coast and import to
New England.
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gas trade network. In Section 2.3, we introduce our fringe and dominant producers’
Cournot game and solve for its unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Section 2.4 is de-
voted to analyzing diﬀerent policy scenarios. Section 2.5 concludes. In the appendix,
we calibrate the model parameters by using natural gas production, consumption,
trade, proved reserves and prices in 2009.
2.2 Schematic representation of the world natural gas market
As in the first chapter, we aggregate producers and consumers into a small number of
regions. Below is the schematic representation of the world natural gas network used
in this chapter.10 We denote the North American exporter11 by North Americane.
Figure 2.1 : Schematic representation
2.3 Model
The notation of this chapter is same as the first chapter.
2.3.1 Fringe and dominant producers’ Cournot game
Given a graph g, each firm fj maximizes its profit by supplying non-negative quantities
to the markets in Ng(fj). Thus, the set of strategic players is the set of firms F . Let
10The blue lines indicate that the natural gas is transported via LNG and the black lines indicate
that the natural gas is transported via pipeline. Half of the natural gas exports from North Africa
to Europe are carried via LNG and half of them are carried via pipeline.
11It purchases natural gas at domestic prices and exports to the Asia Pacific and Europe.
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qij   0 be the quantity supplied by firm fj to market di and ⌦g be the vector of
quantities supplied in graph g. Let r(g) be the size of ⌦g and assume we list the
supply qij above the supply qkl when j < l or j = l and i < k.
We assume that markets have linear inverse demand functions. Specifically, given
a market di and a flow vector ⌦g the price, pi, at di is
pi(⌦g) = ↵i    ihi, (2.1)
where ↵i and  i are positive constants and hi is natural gas consumption in market
di:
hi =
X
fj2Ng(di)
qij. (2.2)
For example, the total consumption in North America in our trade network is
h2 = q22 + q24 + q25 + q26 + q27 + q28 + q29  q12  q32 leading to linear inverse demand
p2 = ↵2    2(q22 + q24 + q25 + q26 + q27 + q28 + q29   q12   q32).
We assume that each natural gas producer has quadratic costs of production in
the short run up to its production capacity, S¯j:
TCj(⌦g) =
 j
2
24 X
di2Ng(fj)
qij
352 where X
di2Ng(fj)
qij  S¯j, (2.3)
We also assume that the cost of exporting natural gas is linear. For firm fj the
short-run total cost of export therefore is
Tj(⌦g) =
X
di2Ng(fj)\dj
⌧ijqij, (2.4)
where ⌧ij is the marginal cost of exporting natural gas to market i.12 If the natural
gas is carried via LNG, ⌧ij includes13 the port-to-port cost of shipment, and the costs
12We assume that cost of exporting natural gas is proportional to the export volume.
13These costs are per unit of natural gas, that is one Bcm in this chapter.
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of liquefaction and regasification. If the natural gas is carried via pipeline, ⌧ij includes
tariﬀs paid to transit countries, the cost of fuel lost during transportation, and the
cost of operations and maintenance of the pipeline.
2.3.2 North American fringe producers
We assume that the domestic producers in North America form a competitive fringe.
Each member of the fringe is too small to influence the market price, and takes the
equilibrium price to be given independently of its own actions.
Let the aggregate cost function of competitive fringe firms in North America be
TC(⌦g) =
 2
2
Q22 (2.5)
where Q2 is the total supply of fringe producers in North America, which is the sum of
North American domestic demand and its exports to Europe and the Asia Pacific.14
In equilibrium, fringe producers supply at p2 =  2Q2 =) Q?2 =
p2
 2
=) q22 =
p2
 2
  q12   q32.
A dominant producer’s demand curve in each market is not the same as the market
demand curve. Their demand curve is the diﬀerence between market demand and
the supply from fringe firms.
The inverse demand function that dominant firms15 face in North America is
p2 = ↵2    2
0BB@
Fringe’s supplyz }| {
p2
 2
  q12   q32 +
Dominant firms’ supplyz }| {
q24 + q25 + q26 + q27 + q28 + q29
1CCA . (2.6a)
14That is,
Q2 =
Domestic Demandz}|{
q22 +
Export Supplyz }| {
q12 + q32 .
15The dominant firms that are connected to North America are South America, West Africa,
North Africa, Russia, the Middle East and Australasia.
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Re-arranging (2.6) we obtain:
p2
✓
1 +
 2
 2
◆
= ↵2    2(q24 + q25 + q26 + q27 + q28 + q29   q12   q32), (2.6b)
which can then be solved for p2:
p2 =
✓
 2
 2 +  2
◆
↵2| {z }
=↵˜2
 
✓
 2
 2 +  2
◆
 2| {z }
= ˜2
(q24+q25+q26+q27+q28+q29 q12 q32). (2.6c)
Since we assume that there is a single price for each region, North America does
not export and import at the same time. Therefore, total exports to North America,
q24 + q25 + q26 + q27 + q28 + q29, and the total exports from North America, q12 + q32,
are not positive in the equilibrium of a same scenario.16
2.3.3 North America as an exporter
The North American exporter, when it exists, is a monopsony buyer who purchases
natural gas from the domestic fringe producers at the price, represented in (2.6c)
and ships to Europe and/or the Asia Pacific. The North American exporter then
maximizes its profit by choosing q12 and q32.
max
q12, q32 0
{ (↵1    1 h1) q12 + (↵3    3 h3) q32   ⌧12q12   ⌧32q32
  (↵˜2    ˜2(q24 + q25 + q26 + q27 + q28 + q29   q12   q32)) (q12 + q32)} (2.7)
where h1 = q11 + q12 + q14 + q15 + q16 + q17 + q18 + q19 and h3 = q32 + q33 + q34 + q35 +
q36 + q37 + q38 + q39.
16To have a unique equilibrium, a bipartition of the network graph is required. If there was more
than one price for North America, such as one price in New England and one price in Houston,
then we would have to disaggregate North America into two regions: New England as an importing
region and Houston as an exporting region. For now, we assume North America as a one region;
either an exporting or an importing region.
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The first order conditions are
q12 : ↵1    1 (q11 + q14 + q15 + q16 + q17 + q18 + q19)  2 1q12   ⌧12   ↵˜2
+  ˜2(q24 + q25 + q26 + q27 + q28 + q29)  2 ˜2(q12 + q32) = 0
q32 : ↵3    3 (q33 + q34 + q35 + q36 + q37 + q38 + q39)  2 3q32   ⌧32   ↵˜2
+  ˜2(q24 + q25 + q26 + q27 + q28 + q29)  2 ˜2(q12 + q32) = 0
Equilibrium exports to Europe are
q?12 =
↵1   ↵˜2    1 (q11 + q14 + q15 + q16 + q17 + q18 + q19) +  ˜2(q24 + q25 + q26 + q27 + q28 + q29)
2 1 + 2 ˜2
  2 ˜2q32 + ⌧12
2 1 + 2 ˜2
(2.8)
while equilibrium exports to the Asia Pacific are
q?32 =
↵3   ↵˜2    3 (q33 + q34 + q35 + q36 + q37 + q38 + q39) +  ˜2(q24 + q25 + q26 + q27 + q28 + q29)
2 3 + 2 ˜2
  2 ˜2q12 + ⌧32
2 3 + 2 ˜2
(2.9)
As we see in (2.8) and (2.9) LNG exports from North America depend on the
elasticities of domestic supply and demand, the elasticities of foreign supply and
demand,17 and the role of short-run capacity constraints.18
17For instance, equilibrium supply of Europe to its domestic market, that is q11 depends on its
elasticity of supply.
18Each dominant producer has a supply constraint in the short-run.
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2.3.4 Dominant producers
In the world natural gas trade network, there are eight dominant producers19 who
have monopoly power in their domestic markets but compete with each other in the
foreign market. Each dominant producer’s objective is to maximize its profits subject
to its supply constraint.
Example: West Africa’s producer, labelled as 5, aims to:
max
q15,q25,q35,q55
{(↵1    1(q11 + q12 + q14 + q15 + q16 + q17 + q18 + q19))q15
+ (↵˜2    ˜2(q24 + q25 + q26 + q27 + q28 + q29   q12   q32))q25
+ (↵3    3(q32 + q33 + q34 + q35 + q37 + q38 + q39))q35 (2.10)
+ (↵5    5q55)q55    5
2
(q15 + q25 + q35 + q55)
2   ⌧15q15   ⌧25q25   ⌧35q35}
subject to
q15 + q25 + q35 + q55  S¯5 and q15, q25, q35, q55   0. (2.11)
We get the first order conditions as:
q15 : ↵1   2 1q15    1(q11 + q12 + q14 + q16 + q17 + q18)   5(q15 + q25 + q35 + q55)
  ⌧15    5   µ15 = 0
q25 : ↵˜2   2 ˜2q25    ˜2(q24 + q26 + q26 + q27 + q28 + q29   q12   q32)
   5(q15 + q25 + q35 + q55)  ⌧25    5   µ25 = 0
q35 : ↵3   2 3q35    3(q32 + q33 + q36 + q37 + q38 + q39)   5(q15 + q25 + q35 + q55)
  ⌧35    5   µ35 = 0
19Unlike the rest of the producers, North America is a fringe producer. However, the North
American exporter is a dominant supplier who competes with the dominant producers in the foreign
markets.
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q55 : ↵5   2 5q55    5(q15 + q25 + q35 + q55)   5   µ55 = 0
where  5 is the Lagrange multiplier of the capacity constraint in (2.11), which can
be interpreted as the shadow price of expanding capacity.
The stylized representation of the current world natural gas model that described
above is a non-cooperative game with coupled payoﬀ functions and coupled con-
straints.20 Applying the Lagrangian multiplier theory to our model is not computa-
tionally convenient. This is because we have a large number of first-order conditions
with inequality constraints (one for each producer) that need to be solved simulta-
neously. Instead, we use the potential game method introduced by Monderer and
Shapley (1994).
Definition 1: Consider the Cournot game that we describe above with linear in-
verse demand functions, quadratic cost of productions and linear costs of exporting.
Assume that there is one non-producing exporter, denoted as fe, buying from one
competitive domestic market, denoted as de. The exporter, fe, supplies other im-
porting markets which are imperfectly competitive. We denote the consumers in the
exporter’s domestic market as de. Then, we define a function
20The coupling arises because producers have a limited production capacity, which in turn limits
their ability to supply markets to which they are connected.
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P ?(Qg) =
X
di2Ng(fj)\de
↵i
0@ X
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1A  X
di2Ng(fj)\de
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0@ X
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X
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⌧ijqij
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 e +  e
 X
1j<kn
qejqek
!
+
↵e e
 e +  e
0@ X
fj2Ng(de)\fe
qej
1A
   e e
 e +  e
0@ X
fj2Ng(de)\fe
q2ej
1A+  e e
 e +  e
0@ X
fj2Ng(de)\fe
qej
1A0@ X
di2Ng(fe)\de
qie
1A
   e e
 e +  e
0@ X
di2Ng(fe)\de
qie
1A2   ↵e e
 e +  e
X
di2Ng(fe)\de
qie
 
X
fj2Ng(di)\fe
 j
2
0@ X
di2Ng(fj)
qij
1A2 (2.12)
subject to
S¯j  
X
di2Ng(fj)
qij for all j 2 F (2.13)
and
qij   0 for all (i, j) 2 g (2.14)
It can be verified that for every link from firm j to market i, that is qij, and for
every link that is not from firm j to market i, that is q ij, P ?(Qg)21 satisfies22
⇡j(qij, q ij)  ⇡j(xij, q ij) = P ?(qij, q ij)  P ?(xij, q ij) (2.15)
and
21Qg is the vector of quantities in graph g.
22⇡j is the optimization problem of dominant firm j in the noncooperative game with constraints.
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⇡e(qie, q ij)  ⇡e(xie, q ij) = P ?(qie, q ij)  P ?(xie, q ij) (2.16)
A function P ? satisfying (2.15) and (2.16) is called a potential function which
requires
@⇡j
@qij
=
@P ?
@qij
for all (i, j) 2 g (2.17)
@⇡e
@qie
=
@P ?
@qie
for all (i, e) 2 g (2.18)
Theorem 1: The solution to the potential game defined in (2.12) subject to con-
straints defined in (2.13) and (2.14) is unique.
max
qij
P ?(Qg) for all (i, j) 2 g (2.19)
More specifically, dominant firm j, fj , maximizes
⇡j(qij) =
X
di2Ng(fj)\de
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2
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X
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and the exporter e, fe, maximizes
⇡e(qie) =
X
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X
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 iq
2
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subject to their supply capacity constraint (of dominant producer) and non-negativity constraints.
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subject to (2.13) and (2.14).
Proof: See Section (2.6.1).
2.4 Scenario analysis
In this section we analyze various scenarios23 in the world natural gas market by
changing the model’s parameters24 exogenously. With each of these changes we opti-
mize a pair of new potential functions subject to new set of constraints.25 Then, we
compare our results with our reference case, that is world natural gas trade in 2009.
2.4.1 Scenario I: Change in North America’s elasticity of domestic supply
Our motivation in this chapter is to understand the impact of shale gas developments
on the world natural gas market. The elasticity of domestic supply is a critical
determinant of the domestic price changes resulting from increased exports. We
therefore change the slope of North American supply curve while holding all else
constant.
In our first experiment, we decreased the slope of North American supply curve
by 40 percent. The price in North America decreases from 150 million USD per Bcm
to 99.91 million USD per Bcm, and the consumption in North America increases from
828 Bcm to 902.61 Bcm, and its natural gas imports are zero. Dominant producers
which exported to North America in 2009, namely South America, West Africa and
North Africa, shift their supply to Europe, the Asia Pacific and their domestic mar-
kets. For instance, South America increases its supply to Europe from 7.6 Bcm to
9.2 Bcm, while North Africa increases its supply to Europe from 67.2 Bcm to 67.75
Bcm. As a result, there will be more competition in the European and Asia Pacific
23Equilibrium trade flows under each scenario are provided in Table (2.2), Table (2.3) and Table
(2.4).
24For calibration of these parameters see the appendix (2.6.2).
25We use the sequential quadratic programming algorithm in MATLAB’s optimization toolbox
to solve for the constrained optimum.
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markets for Russia, the Middle East and Australasia. In response, they decrease their
their supply to Europe and the Asia Pacific. For example, Russia’s supply to Europe
decreases by 0.56 Bcm and its supply to the Asia Pacific decreases by 0.04 Bcm.
A 40 percent decrease in the slope of North American supply curve is not suﬃcient
for the North American exporter to export natural gas to Europe and/or the Asia
Pacific. If we allow for a perfectly elastic North American supply curve, however,
then North America exports 19.71 Bcm of natural gas to Europe and 17.48 Bcm of
natural gas to the Asia Pacific. With these exports, there will be more competition
for all dominant producers in the European or Asia Pacific markets. To prevent a
further decline in equilibrium prices, the dominant producers decrease supply to both
markets. For instance, Russia decreases its equilibrium supply to Europe from 181.1
Bcm to 177.59 Bcm and to the Asia Pacific from 6.2 Bcm to 3.13 Bcm. Under this
scenario, equilibrium total supply to Europe increases from 580.3 Bcm to 584.6 Bcm,
which decreases the equilibrium price from 300 million USD per Bcm to 296.98 million
USD per Bcm. Similarly, equilibrium total supply to the Asia Pacific increases from
394.4 Bcm to 398 Bcm, which decreases the equilibrium price from 320 million USD
per Bcm to 316.56 million USD per Bcm. The decline in equilibrium prices decrease
the profits of dominant producers. For instance, the profit of the Asia Pacific declines
by 1.4 billion USD. Similarly, the profit of Russia declines by 1 billion USD.
All else constant, North America starts exporting when the slope of its supply
curve is 90 percent less than that of 2009. With a 90 percent lower slope, North
America exports 0.7 Bcm to Europe and 0.83 Bcm to the Asia Pacific.
On the other hand, North America stops importing natural gas if we decrease
the slope of North American supply curve by more than just 4 percent. With the 4
percent decline in the slope of its supply curve, it imports 0.47 Bcm of natural gas
from South America. There is thus a big wedge in supply curve slopes where North
American natural gas is a non-traded good, neither exported not imported.
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Further analysis on Scenario I
In this section, first we shift North American supply curve26 upward and keep its
slope constant, and then decrease its slope.
If we increase the intercept of North American supply curve from zero to 19, then
equilibrium exports to North America increase from 15.69 Bcm to 48.61 Bcm. An
upward shift in the North American supply curve increases the marginal profits of
all producers that are connected to it. This shift increases the equilibrium price in
North America from by 10 million USD per Bcm.
Next, we assume a flat North American supply curve with a slope of 19. With this
change, North America again becomes an exporter. It exports 0.6 Bcm to Europe
and 0.75 Bcm to the Asia Pacific and all dominant producers shift their resources
to Europe and the Asia Pacific. For instance, South America increases its supply to
Europe from 7.6 Bcm to 9.17 Bcm while decreasing its supply to North America from
7.6 Bcm to zero.
2.4.2 Scenario II: An increase in Asia Pacific’s natural gas demand
According to EIA projections, natural gas demand in Asia will grow from 341 Bcm
to 497 Bcm from 2008 to 2015. We incorporate these projections into our model by
increasing the choke price in the Asia Pacific by 15 percent. This shifts the demand
curve out in a parallel fashion. We analyze the impact of this demand increase with
a 40 percent, and a 75 percent decrease in the slope of North American supply curve,
and with a flat North American supply curve.
If we allow for a natural gas demand increase in the Asia Pacific without changing
the slope of North American supply curve, then total natural gas exports to North
America decrease to 6.1 Bcm.27 This occurs because all of the producers that are
26In our model, the North American supply curve is p2 =  2Q22 however in this section we assume
it to be p2 = 2 +  2Q22 where we test for diﬀerent values of 2 and/or  2.
27The link from South America carries 4.51 Bcm and the link from North Africa carries 1.59 Bcm
of natural gas.
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connected to the Asia Pacific respond to the demand increase by shifting supply from
Europe, North America and their domestic markets to the Asia Pacific. For instance,
West Africa increases its supply to the Asia Pacific from 6.6 Bcm to 21.23 Bcm by
decreasing its supply to Europe from 10.7 Bcm to zero, and to North America from
3.1 Bcm to zero, and to its domestic market from 10.07 Bcm to 9.24 Bcm. The
decline in total supply to the European market from West Africa, Russia and the
Middle East will result in less competition in Europe for South America and North
Africa. In response, South America and North Africa shift their resources from North
America and their domestic markets to Europe.
Under this scenario, equilibrium total supply to Europe decreases by 7.1 Bcm,
which increases the equilibrium price by 4.97 million USD per Bcm. Similarly, equi-
librium total supply to North America decreases by 2.05 Bcm, which increases the
equilibrium price by 1.39 million USD per Bcm. On the other hand, equilibrium
supply to the Asia Pacific increases by 77.73 Bcm and the equilibrium price increases
by 30.49 million USD per Bcm due to the upward shift in the Asia Pacific demand
curve.
If, on top of the Asian demand increases, we decrease the slope of the North
American supply curve by 40 percent, then total exports to North America decrease
to zero. Under this scenario, North America does not export or import any natural
gas.
If we decrease the slope of the North American supply curve by 75 percent, then
North America exports 3.75 Bcm of natural gas to the Asia Pacific. The equilibrium
prices in North America decrease from 150 million USD per Bcm to 45.48 million
USD per Bcm. However, if we decrease the slope of North American supply curve
by 75 percent but do not allow for exports, the equilibrium price decreases to 45.32
million USD per Bcm. Therefore, the impact of 3.75 Bcm of natural gas exports on
North American domestic natural gas prices is 0.16 million USD per Bcm.
Next, we assume that North America has a flat supply curve. With a flat supply
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curve, North America exports 22.45 Bcm of natural gas to Europe and 39.97 Bcm
of natural gas to the Asia Pacific. In the new equilibrium, total supply to the Asia
Pacific increases by 91.41 Bcm, but the equilibrium price in the Asia Pacific also
increases.28 Profits of dominant producers decrease as the North American supply
curve becomes more elastic.
Further analysis on Scenario II
In this section, first we increase the intercept of North American supply curve and
keep its slope constant, and then decrease its slope.29
If we increase the intercept of North American supply curve to 5, then the equilib-
rium exports to North America decrease by 2.77 Bcm.30 This results in an increase of
4.38 million USD per Bcm in North American prices. However, a 15 percent increase
in the Asia Pacific choke price increase North American prices by only 1.39 million
USD per Bcm.
Next, we assume a flat North American supply curve with an intercept of 50.31
Then, North America becomes an exporter, and it exports 0.28 Bcm to the Asia Pa-
cific. A flat North American supply curve with an intercept of 50 makes all producers
shift supply from North America to Europe and the Asia Pacific. For instance, South
America increases supply to Europe from 7.6 Bcm to 14.24 Bcm.
2.4.3 Scenario III: Decreased competition between Russia and the Middle
East
In this scenario, we assume that Russia and the Middle East collude to maximize their
joint profits. Our motivation is to understand the impact of shale gas developments in
28It increases by 17.65 million USD per Bcm. This is due to the upward shift in the Asia Pacific
demand curve.
29Note that the choke price in the Asia Pacific is also increased by 15 percent in all these cases.
30Among the dominant producers, only South America increases its exports to North America.
31For any intercept that is higher than 50, North America does not export even though its supply
curve is flat.
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North America and resulting exports from it under such collusion. After the merger,
the joint objective of Russia and the Middle East32 is
⇧78 = ↵1(q17 + q18)   1(q11 + q12 + q14 + q15 + q16 + q17 + q18 + q19)(q17 + q18)
+ ↵3(q37 + q38)   3(q33 + q32 + q34 + q35 + q36 + q37 + q38 + q39)(q37 + q38)
+ ↵˜2(q27 + q28)   ˜2(q24 + q25 + q26 + q27 + q28 + q29   q12   q32)(q27 + q28)
  ⌧17q17   ⌧18q18   ⌧27q27   ⌧28q28   ⌧37q37   ⌧38q38 (2.20)
subject to
q17 + q27 + q37 + q77  S¯7 , q18 + q28 + q38 + q88  S¯8
and
q17, q27, q37, q77, q18, q28, q38, q88   0
We optimize the new potential function subject to supply constraints. The new
equilibrium outcome is that the links from Russia to the Asia Pacific and from the
Middle East to Europe carry zero flows, meaning that Russia specializes in the Euro-
pean market and the Middle East specializes in the Asia Pacific. This occurs because
Russia has a lower marginal cost of exporting natural gas to Europe, while the Middle
East has a lower marginal cost of exporting natural gas to the Asia Pacific.
The equilibrium supply from Russia and the Middle East to Europe decreases to
187.8 Bcm whereas the pre-merger total supply of Russia and the Middle East to
Europe was 206.69 Bcm. Similarly, the equilibrium supply to the Asia Pacific from
the Middle East is 50.18 Bcm after the merger, whereas the pre-merger total supply
of Russia and the Middle East together was 53.39 Bcm. In response, South America,
West Africa and North Africa all increase their supply to Europe by decreasing their
supply to North America and to their domestic markets. For instance, West Africa
decreases supply to North America from 3.1 Bcm to zero and decreases supply to
32We label Russia and the Middle East after the merger as 78.
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the Asia Pacific from 6.59 Bcm to 6.41 Bcm, but increases supply to Europe from
10.07 Bcm to 14.1 Bcm. Australasia also increases supply to the Asia Pacific by 1
Bcm. The equilibrium price in each region increases due to the decline in equilibrium
supply. For instance, the equilibrium price in Europe increases by 4.88 million USD
per Bcm due to a 6.9 Bcm decline in total supply. The joint profit of Russia and the
Middle East increases by 1.5 billion USD.
If we allow in addition for a flat North American supply curve, then North America
becomes a net exporter and exports 23.3 Bcm of natural gas to Europe and 18.1 Bcm
of natural gas to the Asia Pacific. Under this scenario, the equilibrium supply of
Russia and the Middle East to Europe decreases to 181.2 Bcm and to the Asia Pacific
decreases to 44.84 Bcm. With a flat North American supply curve, equilibrium total
supply to each region increases, which decreases the equilibrium prices.
The joint profit of Russia and the Middle East increases by 1.5 billion USD com-
pared to no merger scenario. However, with a flat North American supply curve the
joint profit of merged pair is 0.08 billion USD less than the reference case33 (no shale
and no collusion) but 0.06 billion USD more than scenario where there is flat North
American supply curve and no collusion.
Further analysis on Scenario III
In this section, first we shift the North American supply curve upward and keep its
slope constant, and then decrease its slope.
If the intercept of North American supply curve increases to 5, then the equilib-
rium exports to North America increase by 2.85 Bcm, 34 and the equilibrium price in
North America increases by 1.35 million USD per Bcm compared to the case where
33This is because of the lower natural gas prices (compared to no exports from North America)
in the Asia Pacific and Europe as a result of exports from North America.
34The equilibrium export from South America to North America increases by 1.35 Bcm, from
West Africa to North America it increases by 0.32 Bcm and from North Africa to North America it
increases by 1.18 Bcm.
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Russia and the Middle East merge. With this change, equilibrium prices in Europe
and the Asia Pacific increase as well.
Next, we assume a flat North American supply curve with an intercept of 20.35
Under this scenario, North America becomes a net exporter and it exports 0.28 Bcm to
the Asia Pacific. In response to a flat North American supply curve with an intercept
of 20, all dominant producers shift their supply from North America to Europe and the
Asia Pacific. For instance, South America increases supply to Europe from 7.6 Bcm
to 13.75 Bcm. In the new equilibrium, prices in Europe decrease by 1.24 million USD
per Bcm and decrease in the Asia Pacific by 0.75 million USD per Bcm (compared
to the scenario with a merger only).
2.5 Conclusions
This chapter presented a network model of the world natural gas market which con-
sists of consumers, competitive fringe producers, dominant producers and links con-
necting them. To better mimic the world natural gas market, we represented it under
a mixed oligopoly competitive assumption where the North American market is per-
fectly competitive while the rest of the world consists of oligopolistic and monopolistic
markets. We showed that such a noncooperative game has a unique Cournot-Nash
equilibrium. We calibrated the model parameters by using production, consumption,
price, proved reserves and trade flow data in 2009. This allowed us to quantify the
strategic interactions among natural gas producers.
Our scenario analysis focused on the impacts of natural gas exports from North
America on domestic and foreign natural gas prices. We find that equilibrium natural
gas exports from North America depend on the elasticities of domestic and foreign
supplies, the elasticities of domestic and foreign demands, the number of dominant
35For any intercept that is higher than 20, North America does not export even when its supply
curve is flat. However, it imports when the intercept is 150. More specifically, it imports 3.69 Bcm
from South America and 0.69 Bcm from North Africa.
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producers that the North American exporter faces in each market and these domi-
nant producers’ short run supply capacities. Based on our numerical results, North
America exports natural gas when its supply curve is highly elastic and the domestic
price impact of its export is very small. Even so, the price impacts on the markets
it is exporting to are substantial. We also find that shale gas development in North
America decreases dominant producers’ market power elsewhere in the world and
hence decreases the incentive to form a cartel.
2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Since there is a single price for natural gas in each market, the market with competitive
fringe does not export and import. Therefore, there will be some links that become
oﬄine when some others are online and vice versa. Therefore, the potential function
defined in (2.12) represents a network graph with links that work in the opposite
direction.
Let Z(Q?g) = {z 2 N+ : z = ⇢(i, j) for some (i, j) such that q?ij = 0}.36 Let
|Z(Q?g)| = t?, then Q?g Z(Q?g) is vector of size r(g)   t? obtained from Q?g by deleting
the zero entries (where r(g) is the size of Q?g). It is the vector of equilibrium quantities
for links over which there is strictly positive flow from a firm to a market.
Let Q?g be the equilibrium of the Cournot game at network g. We denote by
g Z(Q?g the network obtained from g by deleting the links which have zero flows at
Q?g.
Theorem 2 in Ilkilic (2012): Given two networks g and g0. Let Q?g and Q?g0 be
the equilibrium of Cournot game in g and g0, respectively. If g Z(Q?g) = g0 Z(Q?g0),
then Q?g Z(Q?g) = Q
?
g0 Z(Q?
g0 )
.
For instance, let the network graph g be:
Graph g:
36Note that the notation of labeling links is introduced in the proof of Theorem 1 in (1.8.1).
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and the flow vector of graph g is Qg =
h
q11 q31 q41 q22 q42 q33 q44
i
. Suppose
that in the equilibrium link from firm 2 to market 4 carries zero flows. Therefore, the
equilibrium flow vector is Q?g =
h
q?11 q
?
31 q
?
41 q
?
22 q
?
33 q
?
44
i
.
According to Theorem 2 in Ilkilic (2010) solving the equilibrium of network graph
g0 and g are the same, where g0 is
Graph g0:
Now, we go back to our optimization problem defined in (2.12).
• If q?ie > 0 for any i 2 M \ {de} means that the exporter fe is exporting, =)
q?ej = 0 for all j 2 F \ {fe}. As a result (2.12) becomes
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Following the proof of Theorem 1 in chapter 1, one can show that (2.21) is
strictly concave (or ( 1)⇥ (2.21) is strictly convex)37 and the constraints are
linear.
• If q?ej > 0 for any j 2 F \ {fe} means that the market de is importing, =)
q?ie = 0 for all i 2M \ {de}. Then (2.12) becomes
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37Corollary 2.8 in Zhu (2008) shows that every strictly convex potential game with convex con-
straints admits a unique equilibrium.
66
Following the proof of Theorem 1 in chapter 1, one can show that (2.22) is
strictly concave and the constraints are linear.
2.6.2 Calibration
We calibrate the model parameters by using production, consumption, price, proved
reserves and trade flow data in 2009. We obtain data from BP’s Statistical Review
of World Energy 2010, EIA and various country websites. In this section, we provide
the list of equations that we use in calibration.
The first order conditions of the objective functions of dominant producers’ and
fringe producers:
Europe:
q11 : ↵1   2 1q11    1(q12 + q14 + q15 + q16 + q17 + q18 + q19)   1q11   µ11    1 = 0
North American fringe producers:
q22 : p2    2q22 = 0
North American exporter:
q12 : ↵1   2 1q12    1(q11 + q14 + q15 + q16 + q17 + q18 + q19)  ⌧12   2 ˜2(q12 + q32)  ↵˜2
+  ˜2(q24 + q25 + q26 + q27 + q28 + q29) = 0
q32 : ↵3   2 3q32    3(q33 + q34 + q35 + q36 + q37 + q38 + q39)  ⌧32   2 ˜2(q12 + q32)  ↵˜2
+  ˜2(q24 + q25 + q26 + q27 + q28 + q29) = 0
Asia Pacific:
q33 : ↵3   2 3q33    3(q32 + q34 + q35 + q36 + q37 + q38 + q39)   3q33   µ33    3 = 0
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South America:
q14 : ↵1 2 1q14  1(q11+q12+q15+q16+q17+q18+q19)  4(q14+q24+q34+q44) ⌧14 µ14  4 = 0
q24 : ↵˜2 2 ˜2q24  ˜2(q25+q26+q26+q27+q28+q29 q12 q32)  4(q14+q24+q34+q44) ⌧24 µ24  4 = 0
q34 : ↵3 2 3q34  3(q32+q33+q35+q36+q37+q38+q39)  4(q14+q24+q34+q44) ⌧34 µ34  4 = 0
q44 : ↵4   2 4q44    4(q14 + q24 + q34 + q44)  µ44    4 = 0
West Africa:
q15 : ↵1 2 1q15  1(q11+q12+q14+q16+q17+q18)  5(q15+q25+q35+q55) ⌧15 µ15  5 = 0
q25 : ↵˜2 2 ˜2q25  ˜2(q24+q26+q27+q28+q29 q12 q32)  5(q15+q25+q35+q55) ⌧25 µ25  5 = 0
q35 : ↵3 2 3q35  3(q32+q33+q36+q37+q38+q39)  5(q15+q25+q35+q55) ⌧35 µ35  5 = 0
q55 : ↵5   2 5q55    5(q15 + q25 + q35 + q55)  µ55    5 = 0
North Africa:
q16 : ↵1 2 1q16  1(q11+q12+q14+q15+q17+q18+q19)  6(q16+q26+q36+q66) ⌧16 µ16  6 = 0
q26 : ↵˜2 2 ˜2q26  ˜2(q24+q25+q27+q28+q29 q12 q32)  6(q16+q26+q36+q66) ⌧26 µ26  6 = 0
q36 : ↵3 2 3q36  3(q32+q33+q34+q35+q37+q38+q39)  6(q16+q26+q36+q66) ⌧36 µ36  6 = 0
q66 : ↵6   2 6q66    6(q16 + q26 + q36 + q66)  µ66    6 = 0
Russia:
q17 : ↵1 2 1q17  1(q11+q12+q14+q15+q16+q18+q19)  7(q17+q27+q37+q77) ⌧17  µ17  7 = 0
q27 : ↵˜2 2 ˜2q27  ˜2(q24+q25+q26+q28+q29 q12 q32)  7(q17+q27+q37+q77) ⌧27 µ27  7 = 0
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q37 : ↵3 2 3q37  3(q32+q33+q34+q35+q36+q38+q39)  7(q17+q27+q37+q77) ⌧37 µ37  7 = 0
q77 : ↵7   2 7q77    7(q17 + q27 + q37 + q77)  µ77    7 = 0
Middle East:
q18 : ↵1 2 1q18  1(q11+q12+q14+q15+q16+q17+q19)  8(q18+q28+q38+q88) ⌧18 µ18  8 = 0
q28 : ↵˜2 2 ˜2q28  ˜2(q24+q25+q26+q27+q29 q12 q32)  8(q18+q28+q38+q88) ⌧28 µ28  8 = 0
q38 : ↵3 2 3q38  3(q32+q33+q34+q35+q36+q37+q39)  8(q18+q28+q38+q88) ⌧38 µ38  8 = 0
q88 : ↵8   2 8q88    8(q18 + q28 + q38 + q88)  µ88    8 = 0
Australasia:
q19 : ↵1 2 1q19  1(q11+q12+q14+q15+q16+q17+q18)  9(q19+q29+q39+q99) ⌧19 µ19  9 = 0
q29 : ↵˜2 2 ˜2q29  ˜2(q24+q25+q26+q27+q28 q12 q32)  9(q19+q29+q39+q99) ⌧29 µ29  9 = 0
q39 : ↵3 2 3q39  3(q32+q33+q34+q35+q36+q37+q38)  9(q19+q29+q39+q99) ⌧39 µ39  9 = 0
q99 : ↵9   2 9q99    9(q19 + q29 + q39 + q99)  µ99    9 = 0
Price in Europe:
p1 = ↵1    1(q11 + q12 + q14 + q15 + q16 + q17 + q18 + q19)
Price in North America:
p2 = ↵˜2    ˜2(q24 + q25 + q26 + q27 + q28 + q29   q12   q32)
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Price in Asia Pacific:
p3 = ↵3    3(q32 + q33 + q34 + q35 + q36 + q37 + q38 + q39)
Price in South America:
p4 = ↵4    4q44
Price in West Africa:
p5 = ↵5    5q55
Price in North Africa:
p6 = ↵6    6q66
Price in Russia:
p7 = ↵7    7q77
Price in Middle East:
p8 = ↵8    8q88
Price in Australasia:
p9 = ↵9    9q99
In 2009, links from North America to Europe, q12, from North America to the
Asia Pacific, q32, from South America to the Asia Pacific, q34, from North Africa to
the Asia Pacific, q36, from Russia to North America, q27, from the Middle East to
North America, q28, from Australasia to Europe, q19, and from Australasia to the Asia
Pacific, q29, carried zero flows. Therefore, we do not have any observation to calibrate
parameters in the first order conditions of these links. To get the marginal costs of
these links, ⌧ij’s, we used the marginal costs of the links that have (approximately)
the same LNG distance.38 For instance, we use the calibrated value of ⌧15, from West
38Marginal costs of these links are ⌧12 = 280, ⌧32 = 300, ⌧34 = 340, ⌧36 = 320, ⌧27 = 340,
⌧28 = 320, ⌧19 = 320, ⌧29 = 340
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Africa to Europe to approximate for the marginal cost of exporting natural gas from
North America to Europe.
We get the equilibrium fringe supply in North America as q22 =
p2
 2
. According
to BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy 2010, North America supplied 813 Bcm
of natural gas to its domestic market at a price of 150 million USD per bcm. By
substituting these values into North America’s first order condition we get  2 =
0.1845. Next, we define  2 as a proportion of proved reserves. In eﬀect, we assume
that higher proved reserves39 indicate lower costs of production. We assume that this
proportion holds for each producer hence we define each producer’s   which is the
slope of their supply curves in terms of  2, the slope of North America’s supply curve.
To identify the model parameters uniquely, we assume that North America and
Europe have the same choke price. A justification for the assumption is that, North
America and Europe have similar technologies for using natural gas.
39We obtain data from BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy 2010.
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2.6.3 Scenario I.a: Change in North America’s elasticity of domestic sup-
ply
In this section,40 we analyze the impacts of shale gas developments in North America
in the world natural gas market. Unlike the LNG cost parameters that we used in
our scenario analysis in (2.4.1), we use the LNG cost parameters in Medlock (2012)
and NERA (2012).41 According to the Table 1 of Medlock (2012), liquefaction cost of
1 mcf (thousand cubic feet) of natural gas in the U.S. is 2.92 USD and the transport
cost to United Kingdom is 1.07 USD per mcf and to Japan is 2.15 USD per mcf.
For regasification costs, we use the numbers in Figure 58 of NERA (2012). For this
analysis, we set the marginal cost of exporting natural gas from North America to
Europe to 170 million USD per Bcm and to the Asia Pacific to 210 million USD per
Bcm.
In our first experiment, we decreased the slope of North American supply curve
by 15 percent. The price in North America decreases from 150 million USD per Bcm
to 140.08 million USD per Bcm, and the consumption in North America increases
from 828 Bcm to 843.35 Bcm, and its natural gas imports are zero.
Dominant producers which exported to North America in 2009, namely South
America, West Africa and North Africa, shift their supply to Europe, the Asia Pacific
and their domestic markets. For instance, South America increases its supply to
Europe from 7.6 Bcm to 9.2 Bcm, while North Africa increases its supply to Europe
from 67.2 Bcm to 67.75 Bcm. As a result, there will be more competition in the
European and Asia Pacific markets for Russia, the Middle East and Australasia.
In response, they decrease their their supply to Europe and the Asia Pacific. For
example, Russia’s supply to Europe decreases by 0.56 Bcm and its supply to the Asia
Pacific decreases by 0.04 Bcm.
40Equilibrium trade flows under this scenario are provided in Table (2.5).
41In 2009, the links from North America to Europe, q12, from North America to the Asia Pacific,
q32 carried zero flows. Therefore, we do not have any observation to calibrate parameters in the first
order conditions of these links. As an experiment, we also use the LNG cost parameters in other
studies.
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A 15 percent decrease in the slope of North American supply curve is not suﬃcient
for the North American exporter to export natural gas to Europe and/or the Asia
Pacific. If we decrease the slope of North American supply curve by 20 percent,
then North America exports 2.08 Bcm of natural gas to Europe. With these exports,
there will be more competition for all dominant producers in the European market.
To prevent a further decline in equilibrium prices, the dominant producers decrease
supply to Europe. Under this scenario, equilibrium total supply to Europe increases
from 580.3 Bcm to 581 Bcm, which decreases the equilibrium price from 300 million
USD per Bcm to 299.25 million USD per Bcm.
All else constant, North America starts exporting when the slope of its supply
curve is 20 percent less than that of 2009.
On the other hand, North America stops importing natural gas if we decrease
the slope of North American supply curve by more than just 4 percent. With the
4 percent decline in the slope of its supply curve, it imports 0.5 Bcm of natural gas
from South America.
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Table 2.1 : Network parameters
Parameter Value
Intercept of European inverse demand curve: ↵1 711.55
Intercept of North American inverse demand curve: ↵2 711.55
Intercept of residual inverse demand in North America: ↵˜2 152.27
Intercept of Asia Pacific’s inverse demand curve: ↵3 691.6
Intercept of South America’s inverse demand curve: ↵4 223.2
Intercept of West Africa’s inverse demand curve: ↵5 211.4
Intercept of North Africa’s inverse demand curve: ↵6 168.5
Intercept of Russian inverse demand curve: ↵7 105.02
Intercept of Middle East’s inverse demand curve: ↵8 189.92
Intercept of Australasian inverse demand curve: ↵9 200.47
Slope of European inverse demand curve:  1 0.71
Slope of North American inverse demand curve:  2 0.67
Slope of residual inverse demand in North America:  ˜2 0.145
Slope of Asia Pacific’s inverse demand curve:  3 0.94
Slope of South America’s inverse demand curve:  4 0.69
Slope of West Africa’s inverse demand curve:  5 10.06
Slope of North Africa’s inverse demand curve:  6 0.98
Slope of Russian inverse demand curve:  7 0.082
Slope of Middle East’s inverse demand curve:  8 0.26
Slope of Australasian inverse demand curve:  9 0.72
Slope of European cost curve:  1 0.332
Slope of North American cost curve:  2 0.184
Slope of Asia Pacific’s cost curve:  3 0.358
Slope of South America’s cost curve:  4 0.245
Slope of West Africa’s cost curve:  5 0.281
Slope of North Africa’s cost curve:  6 0.223
Slope of Russian cost curve:  7 0.037
Slope of Middle East’s cost curve:  8 0.024
Slope of Australasian cost curve:  9 0.198
Marginal cost of exporting from South America to Europe: ⌧14 257.29
Marginal cost of exporting from South America to North America: ⌧24 111.58
Marginal cost of exporting from West Africa to Europe: ⌧15 283.84
Marginal cost of exporting from West Africa to North America: ⌧25 140.98
Marginal cost of exporting from West Africa to Asia Pacific: ⌧35 305.2
Marginal cost of exporting from North Africa to Europe: ⌧16 220.84
Marginal cost of exporting from North Africa to North America: ⌧26 117.77
Marginal cost of exporting from Russia to Europe: ⌧17 146.17
Marginal cost of exporting from Russia to Asia Pacific: ⌧37 288.74
Marginal cost of exporting from Middle East to Europe: ⌧18 271.77
Marginal cost of exporting from Middle East to Asia Pacific: ⌧38 265.44
Marginal cost of exporting from Australasia to Asia Pacific: ⌧39 197.26
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Table 2.2 : Equilibrium trade flows (in Bcm) in Scenario I
Route 2009 Decrease Flat North American Decrease Decrease
 2 by 40% supply curve  2 by 4%  2 by 90%
From Europe to Europe 288.10 287.63 285.20 287.63 287.53
From North America to Europe 0.00 0.00 19.71 0.00 0.70
From North America to Asia Pacific 0.00 0.00 17.58 0.00 0.83
From Asia Pacific To Asia Pacific 246.09 245.98 243.45 245.98 245.86
From South America to Europe 7.60 9.26 6.51 9.16 9.15
From South America to North America 7.60 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.00
From South America to Asia Pacific 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From South America to South America 134.70 135.91 136.33 135.85 135.92
From West Africa to Europe 10.70 10.91 8.99 10.92 10.84
From West Africa to North America 3.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From West Africa to Asia Pacific 6.60 7.15 4.89 7.14 7.03
From West Africa to West Africa 10.08 10.11 10.17 10.11 10.11
From North Africa to Europe 67.20 67.76 64.98 67.77 67.65
From North Africa to North America 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From North Africa to Asia Pacific 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From North Africa to North Africa 69.20 69.65 69.93 69.64 69.66
From Russia to Europe 181.10 180.54 177.60 180.55 180.45
From Russia to North America 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From Russia to Asia Pacific 6.20 6.16 3.14 6.16 6.03
From Russia to Russia 485.49 486.10 488.78 486.08 486.31
From Middle East to Europe 25.59 24.91 21.57 24.92 24.78
From Middle East to North America 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From Middle East to Asia Pacific 47.19 47.06 43.74 47.06 46.90
From Middle East to Middle East 345.58 345.61 345.91 345.61 354.62
From Australasia to Europe 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From Australasia to North America 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From Australasia to Asia Pacific 88.30 88.18 85.24 88.18 88.04
From Australasia to Australasia 110.80 110.82 111.17 110.81 110.83
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Table 2.3 : Equilibrium trade flows (in Bcm) in Scenario II
Route 2009 Decrease Decrease  2 Decrease  2 Flat North
 2 by 40% by 75 % by 75% American
w/ exports w/o exports supply curve
From Europe to Europe 288.10 288.10 288.10 288.10 287.07
From North America to Europe 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.45
From North America to Asia Pacific 0.00 0.00 3.75 0.00 39.96
From Asia Pacific To Asia Pacific 246.09 246.10 246.10 246.10 246.10
From South America to Europe 7.60 14.26 14.12 14.26 8.62
From South America to North America 7.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From South America to Asia Pacific 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From South America to South America 134.70 135.16 135.18 135.16 136.01
From West Africa to Europe 10.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.27
From West Africa to North America 3.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From West Africa to Asia Pacific 6.60 21.22 21.17 21.22 19.41
From West Africa to West Africa 10.08 9.26 9.31 9.26 9.80
From North Africa to Europe 67.20 72.40 72.36 72.40 67.12
From North Africa to North America 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From North Africa to Asia Pacific 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From North Africa to North Africa 69.20 69.00 69.04 69.00 69.72
From Russia to Europe 181.10 180.61 180.67 180.61 176.74
From Russia to North America 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From Russia to Asia Pacific 6.20 33.72 32.66 33.72 22.82
From Russia to Russia 485.49 458.47 459.47 458.47 473.24
From Middle East to Europe 25.59 19.17 19.45 19.17 18.55
From Middle East to North America 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From Middle East to Asia Pacific 47.19 70.25 69.35 70.25 61.79
From Middle East to Middle East 345.58 328.98 329.60 328.98 338.06
From Australasia to Europe 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From Australasia to North America 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From Australasia to Asia Pacific 88.30 100.98 100.49 100.98 95.68
From Australasia to Australasia 110.80 98.12 98.61 98.12 103.42
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Table 2.4 : Equilibrium trade flows (in Bcm) in Scenario III
Route 2009 Russia and Middle East Russia and Middle East
merger, without shale merger, with shale
From Europe to Europe 288.10 288.10 287.67
From North America to Europe 0.00 0.00 23.33
From North America to Asia Pacific 0.00 0.00 18.19
From Asia Pacific To Asia Pacific 246.09 246.10 243.89
From South America to Europe 7.60 11.92 9.31
From South America to North America 7.60 4.58 0.00
From South America to Asia Pacific 0.00 0.00 0.00
From South America to South America 134.70 133.39 135.91
From West Africa to Europe 10.70 14.10 11.63
From West Africa to North America 3.09 0.00 0.00
From West Africa to Asia Pacific 6.60 6.42 4.75
From West Africa to West Africa 10.08 9.96 10.14
From North Africa to Europe 67.20 71.46 67.81
From North Africa to North America 5.00 1.68 0.00
From North Africa to Asia Pacific 0.00 0.00 0.00
From North Africa to North Africa 69.20 68.26 69.65
From Russia to Europe 181.10 187.85 181.20
From Russia to North America 0.00 0.00 0.00
From Russia to Asia Pacific 6.20 0.00 0.00
From Russia to Russia 485.49 484.95 488.69
From Middle East to Europe 25.59 0.00 0.00
From Middle East to North America 0.00 0.00 0.00
From Middle East to Asia Pacific 47.19 50.18 44.84
From Middle East to Middle East 345.58 346.58 346.81
From Australasia to Europe 0.00 0.00 0.00
From Australasia to North America 0.00 0.00 0.00
From Australasia to Asia Pacific 88.30 89.26 85.75
From Australasia to Australasia 110.80 109.84 111.11
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Table 2.5 : Equilibrium trade flows (in Bcm) in Scenario I.a
Route 2009 Decrease  2 Decrease  2 Decrease  2
by 20 % by 15 % by 4 %
From Europe to Europe 288.10 287.38 287.63 287.64
From North America to Europe 0.00 2.08 0.00 0.00
From North America to Asia Pacific 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From Asia Pacific To Asia Pacific 246.09 245.97 245.98 245.98
From South America to Europe 7.60 8.98 9.26 9.16
From South America to North America 7.60 0.00 0.00 0.50
From South America to Asia Pacific 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From South America to South America 134.70 135.96 135.91 135.85
From West Africa to Europe 10.70 10.64 10.91 10.93
From West Africa to North America 3.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
From West Africa to Asia Pacific 6.60 7.19 7.15 7.14
From West Africa to West Africa 10.08 10.12 10.11 10.11
From North Africa to Europe 67.20 67.48 67.76 67.78
From North Africa to North America 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From North Africa to Asia Pacific 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From North Africa to North Africa 69.20 69.68 69.65 69.65
From Russia to Europe 181.10 180.24 180.54 180.55
From Russia to North America 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From Russia to Asia Pacific 6.20 6.19 6.16 6.16
From Russia to Russia 485.49 486.37 486.10 486.09
From Middle East to Europe 25.59 24.56 24.91 24.93
From Middle East to North America 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From Middle East to Asia Pacific 47.19 47.05 47.06 47.07
From Middle East to Middle East 345.58 345.63 345.61 345.61
From Australasia to Europe 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From Australasia to North America 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
From Australasia to Asia Pacific 88.30 88.17 88.18 88.18
From Australasia to Australasia 110.80 110.82 110.82 110.82
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Chapter 3
Strategic capacity investments in an imperfectly
competitive world natural gas market
3.1 Introduction
This chapter extends the first chapter, which solved for the constrained Cournot
equilibrium with n producers, each having a fixed supply capacity, and m consumers
connected through a bipartite network. More specifically, in this chapter we relax
the assumption that producers have fixed supply capacities and instead allow them
to invest in their supply capacities.
Models of capacity expansion in oligopolistic markets have tended to be applied
most to electricity markets. This is because the perfect competition assumption is a
strong one when it comes to restructured electricity markets. Even though there are
several studies1 looking at the operations of oligopolistic electricity markets, the liter-
ature on strategic investments in these markets is relatively new. Electricity market
models dealing with both investments and operations start with Murphy and Smeers
(2005), who considered three models of investment in generation capacity. The first
model assumed perfect competition. The second model extended the Cournot model
to include investments in new generation capacities, where capacity is simultaneously
built and sold in long-term contracts (open-loop Nash equilibrium). The third model
separated the investment and sales decision, assuming investment decisions are made
in the first stage and sales in the second stage (closed-loop Nash equilibrium). Mur-
phy and Smeers (2005) considered a simple electricity system where all demand and
supply is concentrated at a single node and there are two generators behaving strategi-
1Among others, see Wei and Smeers (1999), Daxhelet and Smeers (2001).
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cally. The most of the subsequent studies looked at the strategic investment problem
in a duopolistic market. For instance, Ehrenmann and Smeers (2006) developed a
two stage capacity expansion game under the assumption of duopoly. Their model
was similar to Murphy and Smeers (2005), but unlike them, Ehrenmann and Smeers
(2006) assumed no uncertainty. Genc and Zacoor (2010) extended the Murphy and
Smeers (2005) two stage model to a dynamic duopoly with capacity investments un-
der demand uncertainty. Genc and Zacoor (2010) characterized all the open-loop and
closed-loop Nash equilibria of this game.
Ventosa et al. (2002) extended the capacity expansion problem from a duopolistic
electricity market to an oligopolistic electricity market. However, they retained the
assumption of a single demand node. They presented two approaches. In the first
approach, firms choose their output and generating capacity under the assumption of
Cournot competition. In the second approach, a “leader firm” chooses its capacity
in the first stage, as in the Stackelberg game, and then in a second stage all the firms
compete in quantity and capacity as in the Cournot game.
Our model adds to the strategic capacity investment literature by allowing for
Cournot competition in a networked market with multiple demand nodes and multiple
suppliers. However, our model makes a simplifying assumption that the network
graph is fixed. A future extension of this chapter would look for an equilibrium in
a dynamic network graph with demand uncertainties over multiple periods. This is
a diﬃcult problem. There is even a conceptual issue in the problem with multiple
periods. Hartley and Kyle (1989) show that there can be multiple equilibria depending
on what new investors conjecture about future investor behavior.
We modify the first chapter by allowing producers to invest in their supply capac-
ities before making their production decisions. We show that this game can also be
represented as a potential game and the open-loop Cournot-Nash2 equilibrium and
2According to Fudenberg and Levine (1988), in the open-loop, players cannot observe the play of
their opponents. In the closed-loop equilibrium, all past play is common knowledge at the beginning
of each stage. Following their definition, in this chapter we assume that in the open-loop producers
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the closed-loop Cournot-Nash equilibrium of this potential game coincide. We apply
this model to a world natural gas network formed by using BP’s Statistical Review
of World Energy, 2010. We then consider various changes to the basic model in a
number of scenarios. We focus on how to look for strategic investment decisions.
In Section 3.2, we define our open-loop Cournot-Nash game model and solve for
its unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Section 3.3 is devoted to analyzing diﬀerent
policy scenarios. The chapter concludes in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, we introduce
a dynamic game which would be a future extension of this chapter. In the appendix,
we introduce the closed-loop Cournot-Nash game and also calibrate the model pa-
rameters.
3.2 Model
In this section,3 we introduce the open-loop Cournot-Nash game, where capacity
investment and production decisions are made simultaneously. In the appendix, we
introduce the closed-loop Cournot-Nash game4 show that in a two stage game with no
uncertainty, its equilibrium coincides with the equilibrium of the open-loop Cournot-
Nash game.
Following the first chapter, we assume that markets have linear inverse demand
functions. Given a market di and a flow vector Qg the price, pi, at di is
pi(Qg) = ↵i    ihi, (3.1)
where ↵i and  i are positive constants and hi is natural gas consumption in market
do not know their competitiors’ decisions in supply capacity investments and their current supply
decisions, while in the closed-loop equilibrium they do know about the past plays of their competi-
tiors, i.e, supply capacity investments, but they do not know about their competitors’ current supply
decisions.
3We use the same notation as in the first chapter.
4An assumption that the supply capacity investment is not productive instantly, meaning that
there is a lag between a producer’s capacity investment and the production, would be equivalent to
solving the closed-loop Cournot-Nash equilibrium. For further details, see (3.6.1).
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di:
hi =
X
fj2Ng(di)
qij (3.2)
We assume that the natural gas producer has zero costs of production in the short
run up to its production capacity, S¯j = S¯0j + kj,5 and the marginal cost of capacity
investment is constant and positive, ✓j.6 Therefore, the cost of expanding production
capacity by kj is equal to ✓jkj.
We also assume that cost of exporting natural gas is proportional to the export
volume. Therefore, for firm fj the short-run total cost of exporting is
Tj(Qg) =
X
di2Ng(fj)\dj
⌧ijqij, (3.3)
where ⌧ij is the marginal cost of exporting natural gas to market i.
Firm j’s total supply is denoted as sj:
sj =
X
di2Ng(fj)
qij, (3.4)
where sj  S¯j = S¯0j + kj.
Given a graph Qg and a supply capacity of S¯j, firm j maximizes its profit by
choosing qij and kj. Then, the potential function of this game is:
P ?(Qg) =
X
di2Ng(fj)
↵i
0@ X
fj2Ng(di)
qij
1A  X
di2Ng(fj)
 i
0@ X
fj2Ng(di)
q2ij
1A
 
X
di2Ng(fj)
 i
 X
1j<kn
qijqik
!
 
X
di2Ng(fj)\dj
X
fj2Ng(di)
⌧ijqij  
X
fj
✓jkj (3.5)
5S¯0j is the starting capacity at the beginning of period 0 and kj is the capacity expansion in that
period.
6In the calibration, we approximate ✓j by using the inverse of the reserve to production ratio, 
R
P
  1.
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subject to
S¯0j + kj  
X
di2Ng(fj)
qij for all j 2 F (3.6)
and
qij   0 for all (i, j) 2 g (3.7)
and
kj   0 for all j 2 F. (3.8)
It can be verified that for every link from firm j to market i, that is qij, and for every
link that is not from firm j to market i, that is q ij,
⇡j(qij, q ij)  ⇡j(xij, q ij) = P ?(qij, q ij)  P ?(xij, q ij) (3.9)
and for every firm j’s capacity investment, that is kj, and for every firm’s, that is not
firm j, capacity investment, that is k j, P ?(Qg)7 satisfies
⇡j(kj, k j)  ⇡j(tj, k j) = P ?(kj, kj)  P ?(tj, k j) (3.10)
A function P ? satisfying (3.9) and (3.10) is called a potential function, which
requires
@⇡j
@qij
=
@P ?
@qij
for all (i, j) 2 g (3.11)
and
@⇡j
@kj
=
@P ?
@kj
for all (j) 2 g (3.12)
Under no uncertainty, choosing capacity investment and production amounts to
the same thing as choosing capacity investment in the first stage and choosing pro-
7Qg is the vector of quantities in graph g.
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duction in the second stage.8
L =
X
di2Ng(fj)
↵i
0@ X
fj2Ng(di)
qij
1A  X
di2Ng(fj)
 i
0@ X
fj2Ng(di)
q2ij
1A  X
di2Ng(fj)
 i
 X
1j<kn
qijqik
!
 
X
di2Ng(fj)\dj
X
fj2Ng(di)
⌧ijqij +
X
fj2Ng
 j
0@S¯j + kj   X
di2Ng(fj)
qij
1A+ X
fj2Ng
µjkj
+
X
di2Ng(fj)
X
fj2Ng(di)
◆ijqij (3.13)
There exists  ?j , µ?j and ◆?ij such that q?ij,  ?j , µ?j and ◆?ij that satisfy the following
Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions:
@L
@qij
= ↵i   2 iqij    i
0@ X
fk2Ng(di)\{fj}
qik
1A   j   ⌧ij   ◆ij = 0 (3.14a)
@L
@kj
=  ✓j +  j + µj = 0 (3.14b)
@L
@ j
= S¯0j + kj  
X
di2Ng(fj)
qij   0 (3.14c)
@L
@µj
= kj   0 (3.14d)
@L
@◆ij
= qij   0 (3.14e)
 j
@L
@ j
=  j
0@S¯0j + kij   X
di2Ng(fj)
qij
1A = 0 (3.14f)
µj
@L
@µj
= µjkj = 0 (3.14g)
8See Section (3.6.1) for an analysis of the two stage capacity investment and optimal production
game.
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◆ij
@L
@◆ij
= ◆ijqij = 0 (3.14h)
Therefore, equilibrium trade flow from firm j to market i is9
q?ij =
8>>><>>>:
↵i   ⌧ij    j    i
✓ X
fk2Ng(di)\{fj}
qik
◆
2 i
if @⇡j@qij
  
Qg
  0
0 if @⇡j@qij
  
Qg
< 0
(3.15)
and if kj > 0 then µj = 0 =) ✓j =  j =) @C(kj)
@kj
=  ?j .
Theorem 1: The Cournot game has a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Proof of Theorem 1 in chapter 1 applies to the proof this theorem. Note that
the constraints of this game are linear functions of the new choice variables that we
introduced in this chapter, kj.
Proposition 1: When there is no uncertainty, the open-loop Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium and the closed-loop Nash equilibrium investments coincide.
Proof: See Section (3.6.1) in the appendix.
3.3 Scenario analysis
In this section, we analyze the same scenarios10 as in the first chapter by using the
same methodology.11
3.3.1 Scenario I: Increased competition between Russia and the Middle
East
In this scenario, we consider bringing Iraqi gas to the European market via a pipeline
through Turkey, “Nabucco” pipeline. We incorporate this scenario into our model by
9Note that, for i = j, ⌧ij = 0.
10We do not consider the scenarios with an exogenous change in supply capacity.
11Equilibrium trade flows and supply capacity investments are provided in Table (3.2) and Ta-
ble (3.3).
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using the RWGTM’s cost estimate12 for pipeline from Iraq to Istanbul, Istanbul to
Bulgaria and Bulgaria to Austria. We get the marginal cost of exporting to Europe
by taking the weighted average13 of marginal costs of exporting natural gas to Eu-
rope via pipeline and via LNG14, which decreases to 237.97 million USD. With this
reduction, the Middle East increases supply to Europe from 25.6 Bcm to 56.36 Bcm
by expanding its supply capacity by 30.68 Bcm which is 7.3 percent of its supply
capacity in 2009. Unlike the fixed capacity scenario, the Middle East does not sim-
ply reallocate its resources.15 When Nabucco is built there will be more competition
in the European market for all producers that are connected to it: Europe, South
America, West Africa, North Africa and Russia. They will decrease their supply to
Europe to avoid further decline in the equilibrium natural gas price in Europe. For
instance, South America’s equilibrium supply to Europe decreases from 7.6 Bcm to
2.47 Bcm. Similarly, Russia’s equilibrium supply decreases from 181.1 Bcm to 175.97
Bcm.
Under this scenario, equilibrium total supply to Europe increases from 580.3 Bcm
to 585.43 Bcm, which decreases the equilibrium price in Europe from 300 million USD
per Bcm to 294 million USD per Bcm. Since, producers do not shift their resources
between markets, neither the consumption nor the price changes in North America
and the Asia Pacific.
Under this scenario, profits of all producers that are connected to Europe (except
the profits of the Middle East) decline. This is due to a 6 million USD per Bcm decline
in the European price. Profits of the Middle East are 0.75 billion USD higher than
its profits with fixed supply capacity. With capacity investments, the Middle East is
able to increase supply to Europe without shifting supply from the Asia Pacific and
domestic markets.
12We consider tariﬀs paid to transit countries plus the operating and maintenance costs.
13This scenario assumes that 20 percent of natural gas is carried via pipeline and 80 percent is
carried via LNG.
14The cost of exporting natural gas via LNG is calibrated in the previous section.
15This result changes as the marginal cost of expanding supply capacity changes.
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3.3.2 Scenario II: Decreased competition between Russia and the Middle
East
In this scenario, Russia and the Middle East16 collude to maximize their joint profits.
Given the natural gas network we had in 2009, the joint profit of Russia and the
Middle East17 after collusion is
⇧78(Qg) =↵1(q17 + q18)   1(q11 + q14 + q15 + q16 + q17 + q18)(q17 + q18) + ↵3(q37 + q38)
   3(q33 + q35 + q37 + q38 + q39)(q37 + q38)  ⌧17q17   ⌧18q18   ⌧37q37   ⌧38q38
  ✓7k7   ✓8k8 (3.16)
subject to
q17 + q37 + q77  S¯7 + k7 , q18 + q38 + q88  S¯8 + k8
and
q17, q37, q77, q18, q38, q88, k7, k8   0. (3.17)
After the merger, Russia and the Middle East reduce their combined output and
their equilibrium supplies to each of the markets they share, namely Europe and the
Asia Pacific. The new equilibrium outcome is that the links from Russia to the Asia
Pacific and from the Middle East to Europe carry zero flows. This occurs because
Russia has a lower marginal cost of exporting natural gas to Europe, while the Middle
East has a lower marginal cost of exporting natural gas to the Asia Pacific.
The equilibrium supply of Russia and the Middle East to Europe is 185.38 Bcm
after the merger. The pre-merger supply from Russia to Europe was 181.1 Bcm and
from the Middle East to Europe was 25.6 Bcm. Similarly, the equilibrium supply of
Russia and the Middle East to the Asia Pacific is 48.45 Bcm after the merger. The
pre-merger supply from Russia to the Asia Pacific was 6.2 Bcm and from the Middle
East to the Asia Pacific was 47.19 Bcm.
16We call this a “merger” between Russia and the Middle East.
17We label the merged Russia and Middle East supplier as 78.
87
As a result of collusion, prices rise in both Europe and the Asia Pacific. In the
new equilibrium, total supply to Europe decreases from 580.3 Bcm to 576 Bcm, which
increases the equilibrium price from 300 million USD per Bcm to 304.45 million USD
per Bcm. In the new equilibrium, total supply to the Asia Pacific decreases from
394.39 Bcm to 393.1 Bcm, which increases the equilibrium price in the Asia Pacific
from 320 million USD per Bcm to 321.62 million USD per Bcm.
Neither the consumption nor the equilibrium price change in North America.
This is because producers increase their supply to Europe and the Asia Pacific by
expanding their supply capacity and not by shifting supplies from other markets.
In response to Russian and Middle Eastern collusion, other suppliers connected
to Europe and the Asia Pacific invest in their supply capacities to increase their
supply to Europe and the Asia Pacific. For instance, West Africa increases its supply
capacity by 5.52 Bcm, which is approximately 18.13 percent of its supply capacity in
the reference case. Its capacity investment is the highest of all other firms supplying
Europe or the Asia Pacific. That is because it is the only producer that is connected
to both Europe and the Asia Pacific. West Africa increases supply to Europe by 4.27
Bcm and to the Asia Pacific by 1.24 Bcm and expands its supply capacity by 5.52
Bcm.
The joint profit of Russia and the Middle East increases by 1.06 billion USD
compared to total joint profits in 2009. However, their joint profit decreases by
1.12 billion USD compared to a scenario with a merger but holding supply capacities
fixed. The impact of such collusion would be more dramatic on the equilibrium prices
if producers were constrained by their supply capacities.
3.3.3 Scenario III: An increase in Asia Pacific’s natural gas demand
According to the IEA’s 2010 World Energy Outlook, China’s demand is projected to
grow faster than any other region, at an average of almost 6 percent per year 2008-
2035. The IEA report projects that from 2008 to 2015 Asia’s demand will grow from
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341 Bcm to 497 Bcm a year.
The expected demand increase in the Asia Pacific is incorporated into our model
by increasing the choke price in the Asia Pacific by 5 percent. In response, all produc-
ers that are connected the Asia Pacific increase supplies by expanding their supply
capacities. Hence, the total production in the Asia Pacific, West Africa, Russia, the
Middle East and Australasia increase.
West Africa expands its supply capacity by 5.32 Bcm which corresponds to 17.4
percent of its supply capacity in 2009. On the other hand, Russia increases its supply
capacity by 5.22 Bcm which is around 0.77 percent of its supply capacity in 2009.
With the increase in Asia Pacific’s demand, equilibrium supply to the Asia Pacific
increases from 394.34 Bcm to 421.07 Bcm and the equilibrium price increases from
320 million USD per Bcm to 326 million USD per Bcm. Neither the consumption nor
the equilibrium price change in any other region.
The increase in the Asia Pacific price increases the profits of producers connected
to the Asia Pacific. Moreover, the Asia Pacific makes more profit under this scenario
than the scenario with fixed supply capacities. Under fixed supply capacities, the
Asia Pacific is not able expand its supply capacity to respond to an increase in the
demand for natural gas in its domestic market. On the other hand, all other dominant
producers make more profits with the fixed supply capacities, as the equilibrium prices
in all three importing markets were higher.
3.3.4 Scenario IV: Increase in importers’ natural gas demand
In this scenario, we consider an increase in demand for natural gas from all importing
countries. According to IEA’s Energy Outlook, global demand for natural is projected
to increase by 50 percent to 5 trillion cubic meters in 2035.18
These demand increases are incorporated into our model by increasing the choke
prices in Europe, North America and Asia Pacific by 2 percent. With a 2 percent
18See http://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2012/november/name,33015,en.html
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increase in the choke prices, all producers invest in their supply capacities in order to
increase supplies to importing regions. For instance, West Africa expands its supply
capacity by 11.29 Bcm, which corresponds to 37 percent of its supply capacity in
2009. On the other hand, Russia expands its supply capacity by 4.51 Bcm, which
corresponds to 0.67 percent of its supply capacity in 2009.
Under this scenario, total supplies to Europe, North America and the Asia Pacific
increase. Due to the increase in demand, the equilibrium prices in the importing
regions increase. For instance, total supply to Europe increases by 15.17 Bcm and
the equilibrium price increases by 2.6 million USD per Bcm. Similarly, total supply
to North America increases by 26.13 Bcm and the equilibrium price increases by 1.6
million USD per Bcm. The equilibrium price in the Asia Pacific increases by 2.8
million USD per Bcm due to the increase in total supply by 10.66 Bcm.
The profit of each producer increases as the equilibrium prices in the importing
regions increase. All producers would make more profits if there were fixed supply
capacities, or if they cooperated and did not expand their supply capacities. However,
it is hard to maintain such a cooperative behavior as cheating is profitable.
3.3.5 Scenario V: Russia to China pipeline
In this scenario, we assume that Western Siberia and China are connected through
a pipeline. To incorporate this into our model, we use the RWGTM’s cost estimates
for pipeline routes from West Siberia to China. We assume that 30 percent of natural
gas from Russia to the Asia Pacific is carried via pipeline and 70 percent is carried
via LNG.
If 30 percent of natural gas is carried via pipeline, the marginal cost of exporting
one Bcm of natural gas from Russia to the Asia Pacific decreases by 74.72 million
USD per Bcm. With this reduction, Russia increases supply to the Asia Pacific from
6.19 Bcm to 53.5 Bcm. Russia meets this supply to the Asia Pacific by increasing its
supply capacity by 47.3 Bcm. When a Russia-China pipeline is built there will be
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more competition in the Asia Pacific for all producers that are connected to it: the
Asia Pacific, West Africa, the Middle East and Australasia. In response, they decrease
their supply to the Asia Pacific. For instance, equilibrium supply from Australasia
to the Asia Pacific decreases by 10.17 Bcm.
Under this scenario, neither the consumption nor the equilibrium prices change
in Europe and North America. This is because Russia increases supply to the Asia
Pacific without displacing supplies from other markets. However, total supply to the
Asia Pacific increases by 10.17 Bcm, which decreases the equilibrium price by 13.2
million USD per Bcm. If there were no capacity expansions, Russia’s equilibrium
supply to the Asia Pacific would be 5.65 Bcm lower and hence the equilibrium prices
would be 1.83 million USD per Bcm higher.
Under this scenario, profit of Russia increases by 3.66 billion USD, which is 1.53
billion USD more than its profits increase when supply capacities are fixed. All other
producers connected to the Asia Pacific make less profits both because their market
share decreases and also because the equilibrium price in Asia Pacific declines. On
the other hand, producers that are not connected to the Asia Pacific make the same
profits as in 2009. This is because equilibrium trade flows in these links do not change.
Therefore, equilibrium prices remain unchanged. However, other producers prefer a
scenario where the Russia-China pipeline is built and the supply capacities are fixed
to this scenario. Under the fixed supply capacities, Russia displaces its supplies from
Europe and its domestic market to the Asia Pacific which increases prices in the
European market.
3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we solved for the equilibrium strategic capacity investments and trade
flows in a network model of the world natural gas market which consists of consumers,
producers (which are represented as strategic Cournot players) and links connecting
them. We assumed a two period model with no uncertainty and showed that this
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game has a unique Nash equilibrium. We also showed that the open-loop Cournot-
Nash equilibrium and closed-loop Cournot-Nash equilibrium investments of this game
coincide. Our chapter contributes to the literature in strategic capacity investments
by allowing for Cournot competition in a networked market with multiple demand
nodes and multiple suppliers. In this chapter, we assume that the strategic capacity
investments are continuous. However, in reality economies of scale will make the ca-
pacity investments lumpy. A good extension of this chapter would follow Hartley and
Kyle (1989), where demand grows smoothly over time and the investment is the only
cost which has a fixed size. In their paper, they show that there is an eﬃcient invest-
ment path which is a function of the investment sequence and investment times. They
also show the oligopolistic market can have multiple equilibria depending on what in-
vestors believe about future investment decisions. Similar problem can be applied to
this network problem to solve for the strategic investment path with lumpiness.
We looked at the same scenarios as we looked at in our first chapter and compared
the results. We find that producers respond to changes in market conditions by
investing in their supply capacities instead of displacing their resources from other
markets.
3.5 Future research
A future extension of this problem would involve a dynamic network. A way to do
this is to allow for a complete network graph; an m market n producer Cournot
game requires m ⇥ n links connecting them. In each stage, some links may come
online, while others may not be used. We assume that each link has a fixed flow
capacity. Each producer could a fixed supply capacity in the short-run, but can
invest in link and supply capacities. However, these investments are not productive
instantly. Therefore, in each period, producer j chooses how much to supply to each
market that it is connected to and how much to invest in its links’ flow capacities
and its supply capacity for future periods. We also assume that producer j’s current
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capacities depreciate from this period to next period at a fixed rate of ⌘j for its supply
capacity and at a fixed rate of ◆ij for its links’ flow capacity.
The Bellman equation of such a potential game would be:
V (S¯tj, q¯
t
ij) = max
qtij ,k
t
j ,x
t
ij
X
di
↵i
X
fj
qtij  
X
di
 i
X
fj
(qtij)
2  
X
di
 i
 X
1j<kn
qtijq
t
ik
!
 
X
di
X
fj
⌧ijq
t
ij  
X
fj
✓jk
t
j  
X
di
X
fj
ijx
t
ij + ⇢V (S¯
t+1
j , q¯
t+1
ij )
(3.18)
subject to X
di
qtij  S¯tj and the Lagrange multiplier is  tj (3.19a)
q¯tij   qtij for all (i, j) and the Lagrange multiplier is µtij (3.19b)
qtij, k
t
j, x
t
ij   0 and the Lagrange multipliers are !tij, ✏tj, $tij (3.19c)
where
S¯t+1j = (1  ⌘j)S¯tj  
X
di
qtij + k
t
j (3.20a)
q¯t+1ij = (1  'ij)q¯tij + xtij (3.20b)
Since our resource is nonrenewable, we need to subtract the amount of resource
depleted in period t to get the available supply capacity in period t + 1 which is
indicated in (3.20a). In this problem, there are (m ⇥ n) + n state variables and
2 ⇥ (m ⇥ n) + n choice variables. Unfortunately, solving this problem numerically
will be difficult because of the curse of dimensionality19 as the state space grows
19According to Doraszelski and Judd (2012), discrete-time games are limited by their computa-
tional burden. In particular, under standard assumptions, there is a curse of dimensionality, since
the cost of computing players’ expectations over all possible future states increases exponentially in
the number of state variables. In the network presented in this dissertation, there are 9 producers
and 9 consumers, which makes 90 state and 171 choice variables in each period t before we introduce
exogenous uncertainty.
93
exponentially with both the number of game players and of possible states. Instead,
we attempt to derive the first order conditions and the Euler equations for the closed
form solution.
The first order conditions with respect to choice variables at time t are
qtij : ↵i 2 iqtij  i
✓X
k 6=j
qtik
◆
 ⌧ij  tj µtij !tij+⇢
@V (S¯t+1j , q¯
t+1
ij )
S¯t+1j
( 1) = 0 (3.21a)
ktj :  ✓j + ✏tj + ⇢
@V (S¯t+1j , q¯
t+1
ij )
S¯t+1j
= 0 (3.21b)
xtij :  ij +$tij + ⇢
@V (S¯t+1j , q¯
t+1
ij )
q¯t+1j
= 0 (3.21c)
and the first order conditions with respect to state variables at time t:
S¯tj :
@V (S¯tj, q¯
t
ij)
S¯tj
=  tj + ⇢
@V (S¯t+1j , q¯
t+1
ij )
S¯t+1j
(1  ⌘j) (3.22a)
q¯tij :
@V (S¯tj, q¯
t
ij)
q¯tij
= µtij + ⇢
@V (S¯t+1j , q¯
t+1
ij )
q¯t+1j
(1  'ij) (3.22b)
Theorem 2: There is unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium in each period t.
Proof: The proof follows from the fact that the Bellman equation of our potential
game is strictly concave. V : R2⇥(m⇥n)+n ! R. We divide V into three parts since we
know that the sum of concave functions is also concave. The first part includes qij’s
only and from the proof of first theorem we know that its Hessian negative definite.
The other two parts are linear functions of ktj and xtij which concludes that they
are concave. Our constraints are also linear in terms of choice variables. Therefore,
following Zhu (2008), our potential function has a unique equilibrium.
We know that there is a unique equilibrium in each time period t; we need to
check the optimal path to the steady state (if it exists).
Next insert (3.21b) and (3.21c) into the first order conditions with respect to the
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state variables,
@V (S¯tj, q¯
t
ij)
S¯tj
=  tj + (✓j   ✏tj)(1  ⌘j) (3.23a)
@V (S¯tj, q¯
t
ij)
q¯tij
= µtij + (ij  $tij)(1  'ij) (3.23b)
and iterate them by one period
@V (S¯t+1j , q¯
t+1
ij )
S¯t+1j
=  t+1j + (✓j   ✏t+1j )(1  ⌘j) (3.24a)
@V (S¯t+1j , q¯
t+1
ij )
q¯tij
= µt+1ij + (ij  $t+1ij )(1  'ij). (3.24b)
Substitute (3.24a) into (3.22a) and (3.24b) into (3.22b)
@V (S¯tj, q¯
t
ij)
S¯tj
=  tj + ⇢( 
t+1
j + (✓j   ✏t+1j )(1  ⌘j))(1  ⌘j) (3.25a)
@V (S¯tj, q¯
t
ij)
q¯tij
= µtij + ⇢(µ
t+1
ij + (ij  $t+1ij )(1  'ij))(1  'ij). (3.25b)
Since we know that (3.23a) is equal to (3.25a) and (3.23b) is equal to (3.25b), we
then get
◆
◆ tj + (✓j   ✏tj)⇠⇠⇠⇠(1  ⌘j) = ◆◆ tj + ⇢( t+1j + (✓j   ✏t+1j )(1  ⌘j))⇠⇠⇠⇠(1  ⌘j) (3.26a)
 
 µtij + (ij  $tij)⇠⇠⇠⇠⇠(1  'ij) =  µtij + ⇢(µt+1ij + (ij  $t+1ij )(1  'ij))⇠⇠⇠⇠
⇠(1  'ij) (3.26b)
thus
 t+1j =
(✓j   ✏tj)  ⇢(✓j   ✏t+1j )(1  ⌘j)
⇢
(3.27a)
µt+1ij =
(ij  $tij)  ⇢(ij  $t+1ij )(1  'ij)
⇢
. (3.27b)
Next we re-date (3.27a) and (3.27b) to period t and insert them into (3.21a) to get
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the Euler equations for qtij:
↵i 2 iqtij  i
✓X
k 6=j
qtik
◆
 ⌧ij  tj µtij !tij ⇢( t+1j +(✓j ✏t+1j )(1 ⌘j)) = 0 (3.28a)
After rearranging the terms, (3.28a) becomes
↵i   2 iqtij    i
✓X
k 6=j
qtik
◆
  ⌧ij   µtij   !tij  
✓j   ✏t 1j
⇢
  ⌘j(✓j   ✏t 1j ) = 0 (3.28b)
Similarly, we get the Euler equations for ktj and xtij as:
ktj :  ✓j + ✏tj + ⇢( t+1j + (✓j   ✏t+1j )(1  ⌘j)) = 0 (3.29)
xtij :  ij +$tij + ⇢(µt+1ij + (ij  $t+1ij )(1  'ij)) = 0 (3.30)
For the steady state values, we drop the time superscripts and get
↵i   2 iq?ij    i
✓X
k 6=j
q?ik
◆
  ⌧ij   µ?ij   !?ij  
✓j   ✏?j
⇢
  ⌘j(✓j   ✏?j) = 0 (3.31a)
  ✓j + ✏?j + ⇢( ?j + (✓j   ✏?j)(1  ⌘j)) = 0 (3.31b)
  ij +$?ij + ⇢(µ?ij + (ij  $?ij)(1  'ij)) = 0 (3.31c)
We also know that in the steady state (3.20a) and (3.20b) are going to be
S¯?j = (1  ⌘j)S¯?j  
X
di
q?ij + k
?
j =) S¯?j =
 Pdi q?ij + k?j
⌘j
  0, (3.32a)
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which means that in the steady state k?j 
X
di
q?ij.
q¯?ij = (1  'ij)q¯?ij + x?ij =) q¯?ij =
x?ij
'ij
  0 (3.32b)
In the future, we will solve for the steady state values and also include discrete
fixed size capacity investments into the problem.
3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Two stage capacity investment and production game (Closed-loop
Cournot-Nash game)
Proof of Proposition 1: We consider a two stage game where in the first stage
producers invest in their supply capacities and in the second stage they choose their
production. We assume that there is no uncertainty.
In the second stage producers maximize their profit subject to their supply capacity
constraints. Given a graph Qg and a supply capacity of S¯j, firm j maximizes its profit
by choosing qij.
max
qij
8<: X
di2Ng(fj)
↵iqij  
X
di2Ng(fj)
 iqijhi  
X
di2Ng(fj)\dj
⌧ijqij
9=; (3.33)
= max
qij
8<: X
di2Ng(fj)
↵iqij  
X
di2Ng(fj)
 iq
2
ij  
X
di2Ng(fj)
 iqij
X
fk2Ng(di)\fj
qik  
X
di2Ng(fj)\dj
⌧ijqij
9=;
subject to X
di2Ng(fj)
qij  S¯j = S¯0j + kj (3.34a)
qij   0 for all (i, j) 2 g (3.34b)
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where S¯0j is the initial capacity at the beginning of period 0.
L =
X
di2Ng(fj)
↵iqij  
X
di2Ng(fj)
 iqijhi  
X
di2Ng(fj)\dj
⌧ijqij +  j
0@S¯j   X
di2Ng(fj)
qij
1A
+
X
di2Ng(fj)
◆ijqij (3.35)
Then there exists  ?j and ◆?ij such that q?ij,  ?j and ?ij satisfy the following Kuhn-
Tucker optimality conditions
@L
@qij
= ↵i   ⌧ij    i
0@ X
fk2Ng(di)\{fj}
qik + 2q
?
ij
1A   j + ◆ij = 0 (3.36a)
@L
@ j
= S¯j  
X
di2Ng(fj)
qij   0 (3.36b)
@L
@◆ij
= qij   0 (3.36c)
 j
@L
@ j
=  j
0@S¯j   X
di2Ng(fj)
qij
1A = 0 (3.36d)
◆ij
@L
@◆ij
= ◆ijqij = 0 (3.36e)
We get the Cournot-Nash equilibrium20 flow of q?ij
q?ij =
8>>><>>>:
↵i   ⌧ij    j    i
✓ X
fk2Ng(di)\{fj}
qik
◆
2 i
if @⇡j@qij
  
Qg
  0
0 if @⇡j@qij
  
Qg
< 0
(3.37)
in the first stage, producer j chooses his optimal capacity investment
20Ilkilic (2010) shows that the unconstrained Cournot game in a bipartite graph has a unique
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max
k¯j
⇧?j(q
?
ij)  C(S¯j) (3.38)
Proposition 2:Firm j’s profit maximizing supply capacity is obtained by solving
C 0(k¯j)   ?j = 0.
Proof: Let
Vj(S¯j, S¯ j) = max
qij
⇧(qij) (3.39)
subject to
X
di2Ng(fj)
qij  S¯j (3.40)
By the Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions:
 ?j
0@S¯j   X
di2Ng(fj)
q?ij
1A = 0 (3.41)
Hence,
Vj(S¯j, S¯ j) = ⇧?j(q
?
ij) +  
?
j
0@S¯j   X
di2Ng(fj)
q?ij
1A (3.42)
By the envelope theorem
@Vj(S¯j, S¯ j)
@k¯j
=
@⇧?j(q
?
ij)
@k¯j| {z }
=0
+ ?j (3.43)
Hence, maxS¯j ⇧
?
j(q
?
ij)  C(S¯j) is  ?j   C 0(k¯j) = 0 since S¯j = S¯0j + kj.
3.6.2 Calibration
In order to quantitatively evaluate diﬀerent policy scenarios, we first need to calibrate
the theoretical model. To calibrate the model parameters, we use the production,
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consumption, price and trade flow data in 2009. The price data is obtained from
international Energy Agency’s (IEA) website and other country websites. The data on
production, consumption, and trade flows are obtained from BP’s Statistical Review
of World Energy 2010.
For calibration, we use the first order conditions of our model. The first order
conditions with respect to equilibrium flows are same as the ones in the first chapter.21
Example: The South American producer labeled as 4, has the objective22
max
q14,q24,q44,k4
⇧4(Qg) = max
q14,q24,q44,k4
{p1q14 + p2q24 + p4q44   ⌧14q14   ⌧24q24   ✓4k4}
(3.44)
subject to
q14 + q24 + q44  S¯4 + k4 and q14, q24, q44, k4   0 (3.45)
By considering the links that carry positive flows23 in equilibrium, we get the first
order conditions as:
q14 : ↵1   2 1q14    1(q11 + q15 + q16 + q17 + q18)  ⌧14    4   ◆14 = 0 (3.46a)
q24 : ↵2   2 2q24    2(q22 + q25 + q26)  ⌧24    4   ◆24 = 0 (3.46b)
q44 : ↵4   2 4q44    4   ◆44 = 0 (3.46c)
k4 :  ✓4 +  4 + µ4 = 0 (3.46d)
We assume an interior solution for the capacity constraint,24 q?14+ q?24+ q?44 < S¯4, this
21The reason is that we have the same network with same equilibrium trade flows, production,
consumption and price.
22For the sake of identification of the problem, we assume that the cost of transporting natural
gas to the domestic market is zero.
23According to Ilkilic (2010), links that carry zero flows in equilibrium have no role in determining
the equilibrium.
24We make this assumption only when calibrating the parameters. This assumption is realistic
especially in 2009, where due to the global recession, producers had excess supply capacities. When
analyzing alternative scenarios we do not impose this assumption.
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implies  4 = 0. Therefore, the first order condition in (3.46d) =) ✓4 = µ4 meaning
that Kuhn-Tucker condition (3.14g) is satisfied when k4 = 0.25 We approximate
the marginal cost of expanding production capacity by the inverse of reserves26 to
production ratio. If we assume that countries have the same production technologies,
then producers with a higher reserves to production ratio must have lower costs of
supply capacity expansion. However, our numerical results are sensitive to the choice
of this marginal cost parameter.27
We apply the same equilibrium condition to each producer from 1 to 9, and get
twenty one equations. We also have 9 equations, 1 price equation for each market.28
25This is because ✓4 is positive and constant.
26We obtain proved reserves data from BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy, 2010.
27If the cost of expanding capacity is suﬃciently high, the producer chooses to displace its re-
sources rather than invest in capacity. The resulting outcome would then be the same as in Chapter
1.
28Natural gas import prices are usually diﬀerent for each importer and this price may be diﬀerent
from the domestic producer’s price. However, our model assumes that there is a single price of
natural gas in each region, which is determined by the total supply of producers connected to that
region.
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Table 3.1 : Network parameters
Parameter Value
Choke price in Europe ↵1 904.27
Choke price in North America ↵2 302.9
Choke price in Asia Pacific ↵3 832.83
Choke price in South America ↵4 260.02
Choke price in West Africa ↵5 220.01
Choke price in North Africa ↵6 199.97
Choke price in Russia ↵7 130.03
Choke price in Middle East ↵8 200.01
Choke price in Australasia ↵9 239.99
Slope of European inverse demand curve  1 1.041
Slope of North America’s inverse demand curve  2 0.184
Slope of Asia Pacific’s inverse demand curve  3 1.3003
Slope of South America’s inverse demand curve  4 0.965
Slope of West Africa’s inverse demand curve  5 10.912
Slope of North Africa’s inverse demand curve  6 1.445
Slope of Russia’s inverse demand curve  7 0.134
Slope of Middle East’s inverse demand curve  8 0.2894
Slope of Australasian inverse demand curve  9 1.083
Marginal cost of exporting from South America to Europe ⌧14 292.08
Marginal cost of exporting from South America to North America ⌧24 148.59
Marginal cost of exporting from West Africa to Europe ⌧15 288.85
Marginal cost of exporting from West Africa to North America ⌧25 149.43
Marginal cost of exporting from West Africa to Asia Pacific ⌧35 311.41
Marginal cost of exporting from North Africa to Europe ⌧16 230.02
Marginal cost of exporting from North Africa to North America ⌧26 149.07
Marginal cost of exporting from Russia to Europe ⌧17 111.41
Marginal cost of exporting from Russia to Asia Pacific ⌧37 311.93
Marginal cost of exporting from Middle East to Europe ⌧18 273.34
Marginal cost of exporting from Middle East to Asia Pacific ⌧38 258.62
Marginal cost of exporting from Australasia to Asia Pacific ⌧39 205.18
Europe’s marginal cost of supply capacity investment ✓1 0.054
North America’s marginal cost of supply capacity investment ✓2 0.089
Asia Pacific’s marginal cost of supply capacity investment ✓3 0.038
South America’s marginal cost of supply capacity investment ✓4 0.019
West Africa’s marginal cost of supply capacity investment ✓5 0.006
North Africa’s marginal cost of supply capacity investment ✓6 0.017
Russia’s marginal cost of supply capacity investment ✓7 0.012
Middle East’s marginal cost of supply capacity investment ✓8 0.006
Australasia’s marginal cost of supply capacity investment ✓9 0.021
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Table 3.3 : Equilibrium supply capacity investments (in Bcm)
2009 Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Scenario V
Europe 288.10 0.00 4.23 0.00 2.45 0.00
North America 813.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.23 0.00
Asia Pacific 246.10 0.00 1.22 5.32 2.11 0.00
South America 149.90 0.00 4.25 0.00 9.11 0.00
West Africa 30.48 0.00 5.53 5.32 11.29 0.00
North Africa 141.40 0.00 4.22 0.00 9.09 0.00
Russia 672.80 0.00 0.00 5.23 4.52 47.17
Middle East 418.40 30.69 0.00 5.28 4.56 0.00
Australasia 199.10 0.00 1.23 5.33 2.12 0.00
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